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RACE AND FOREIGN POLICY IN REFUGEE LAW:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF
THE HAITIAN REFUGEE CRISES
INTRODUCTION
Through the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
treaties to which the United States is a party are the supreme laws of
the land.1 This took on new meaning with potentially far-reaching im-
plications in the wake of World War II. The events leading up to the
war and the brutality of the Holocaust spawned previously unparal-
leled international cooperation in establishing protections for basic
human rights.2 The outrage over wartime atrocities formed the foun-
dation of the United Nations, and the various human rights instru-
ments promulgated under its auspices both articulated and helped
shape an international consensus regarding the protection of human
rights.3
The United States ostensibly has been one of the leading propo-
nents of international human rights, acceding to many major human
rights treaties4 and playing a significant role in United Nations peace-
keeping operations, such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Haiti.
Reality, however, reveals the American government's commitment to
the international protection of human rights is somewhat dubious. Il-
lustrating this point is the opinion of George F. Kennan, one of the
leading architects of United States foreign policy after World War II:
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
2. FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN Riors: LAW, POLICY,
AND PROCESS 6 (2d ed. 1996).
3. See generally id. at 6-13 (discussing the movement towards protecting international human
rights, the formation of the United Nations, and the subsequent codification of human rights
obligations under its charge).
4. Some notable treaties to which the United States is party include the United Nations Char-
ter, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Organization of American States Char-
ter, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, among others. See id. at 37-39.
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We have about 50 percent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 per-
cent of its population .... In this situation, we can not fail to be the
object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period
is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to main-
tain this position of disparity ... We need not deceive ourselves that
we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefac-
tion.... We should cease to talk about vague and... unreal objec-
tives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and
democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have
to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered
by idealistic slogans, the better.5
All rhetoric aside, there is little indication that any subsequent admin-
istration has deviated from Kennan's fundamental assessment. In-
deed, while claiming adherence to formal human rights protections,
the United States has, at best, construed its international human rights
obligations very narrowly. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
American relations with Haiti. The United States government was ex-
ploiting the people of Haiti long before the pronouncements of post-
war foreign policy pundits. Kennan's advice, however, at least
implicitly recommended that the United States ignore the same princi-
ples of the postwar human rights treaties that it was ratifying at that
time.6 The American government has done this with impressive re-
solve when dealing with Haiti.
The most recent chapter in Haiti's long but little-discussed history
of exploitation at the hands of the United States-and the focus of
this Comment-primarily involves American asylum laws as they per-
tain to Haitians. Specifically, when a line of United States supported
dictators sent thousands of Haitian refugees to American shores, the
superpower responded with the "Haitian Program."' 7 This program,
carried out mostly through a series of executive orders and Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS") procedures, 8 virtually elimi-
nated for most Haitian refugees the possibility of receiving any kind of
asylum hearing for entry into the United States, let alone temporary
protection.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court consid-
ered one aspect of the Haitian Program that constituted a potential
violation of America's international legal obligations, not to mention
domestic law. These specific legal obligations are embodied in a
5. NOAM CHOMSKY, THE CHOMSKY READER 318 (James Peck ed., 1987) (quoting Policy Plan-
ning Staff No. 23, Review of Current Trends in United States Foreign Policy, Feb. 1948).
6. This is the author's interpretation of Kennan's advice.
7. See infra notes 78-141 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
9. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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treaty to which the United States is a party, and are thus the "the
supreme Law of the Land."'10 The complaint was brought by the Hai-
tian Centers Council on behalf of unnamed Haitian refugees being
intercepted at sea by the United States Coast Guard and returned to
the tempestuous situation in Haiti."' Haitian Centers Council chal-
lenged the interdiction program initiated under President Reagan and
continued under Presidents Bush and Clinton.' 2 The complaint al-
leged that the interdiction program violated the obligation of non-re-
turn under § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
and corresponding obligations under Article 33 of the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.' 3 Although the Court
insisted that the complaint presented strictly legal issues,14 policy con-
siderations proved difficult to escape. In particular, the Court's deci-
sion would favor either "vague" and "unreal" human rights
objectives' 5 or the pragmatic criteria of United States foreign policy.
The Court ultimately upheld the interdiction program, holding that
the obligation of non-return embodied in both domestic and interna-
tional laws did not extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States.16 In reaching this decision, unfortunately, the Court
conformed to Kennan's prescription.
The Court's decision in Sale did not signal the end of the challenges
to the Haitian Program, particularly the interdiction process. The
postwar instruments that formed the backbone of the international
human rights mandate also provided for various enforcement mecha-
nisms. While the Court considered the Sale case, the complainants
filed a petition with one such regional international legal forum, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("the Commission").' 7
Apparently not constrained by the particular brand of "objectivity"
typically employed by American courts,18 the Commission's recom-
mendation in the 1996 Annual Report 9 found that the United States
shirked its obligation of non-return under Article 33 by interdicting
the Haitian refugees.20 In coming to this conclusion, the Commission
expressly disagreed with the Supreme Court's holding that Article 33
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
111. Sale, 509 U.S. at 166.
12. Id. at 158-59.
13. Id. at 167.
14. Id. at 165-66.
15. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 318.
16. Sale, 509 U.S. at 159.
17. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550, OEA/ser. L.N./1l.84, doc. 51 (1997).
18. See infra notes 475-77 and accompanying text.
19. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550.
20. Id. at 599.
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was not intended to apply extraterritorially. 21 The Commission also
considered more general interpretations of the "vague" and "unreal"
human rights objectives that so vexed Kennan.22
The Haitian Program, and the court decisions like Sale that ap-
proved it, elicited both criticism and praise. The debate over the Hai-
tian Program, however, including the issues as they were framed by
the Commission's re-visitation of Sale, failed to address its significance
as part of the historical context of Haitian-American relations. By
failing to place the Haitian Program within this background, most
commentators miss the racial contingencies of American asylum poli-
cies towards Haitians.
The history between the United States and Haiti is one that is
fraught with racial tensions. An assessment of the refugee and immi-
gration laws as a part of this history makes apparent the continuing
nature of this racism. This Comment evaluates the United States' use
of asylum laws as a means of continued exploitation of the Haitian
population.
Part I delineates the relevant international and domestic legal pro-
tections for refugees.23 It offers a critical analysis of the policies that
comprised the Haitian Program and the extent to which the Program
complied with these legal protections. This section also outlines the
litigation over the Haitian Program, both in domestic courts and
before international forums.
Part II offers a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Sale and compares its disposition with the decision of the Commis-
sion.24 This section also advances a history of Haitian-American rela-
tions. This history provides the prism through which any adequate
consideration of the Haitian Program must be viewed, and it is thus
appropriately located in the analysis portion of this Comment. When
viewed against this background, the shortcomings and limited nature
of both the Court's and the Inter-American Commission's analyses
are readily apparent. In an attempt to offer an alternative and more
complete assessment of the Haitian Program, Part II compares the
treatment of Haitian refugees with that of other refugee groups flee-
ing to the United States. Using the Haitian-American history and asy-
lum statistics, the analysis breaks down the official justifications
provided for the Haitian Program, its racial contingencies, and the
21. Id.
22. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 318.
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
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"position of disparity" 25 sought to be achieved by the American gov-
ernment through the application of the Haitian Program.
Finally, Part III briefly analyzes the shortcomings of both domestic
and international legal processes and how they ultimately failed the
Haitian refugees.2 6 It also reconsiders the American policy toward
the refugees within the international scheme of refugee protection.
Specifically, it examines potential solutions to the continued subordi-
nation and exploitation of the Haitian population through American
asylum policies. This section concludes with a critical assessment of
the Eurocentric nature of the international scheme and its implica-
tions for refugees of color. The contention that "rich, white" coun-
tries were responsible for the postwar human rights instruments is not
novel, but the case of Haiti illuminates the extent to which the "inter-
national protection of human rights" serves the purposes of the pow-
erful, a characteristic with undeniable racial implications. The pattern
is familiar.
I. BACKGROUND: NON-REFOULEMENT AND
THE HAITIAN PROGRAM
The overwhelming majority of the Haitian population has long en-
dured severe poverty and its concomitant political turmoil.27 Haiti's
tumultuous history reached new depths, however, under the harsh
rule of Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude
("Baby Doc") Duvalier.28 Their campaign of terror sent tens of
thousands of Haitians seeking refuge on foreign shores throughout the
1970s and 1980s.29 After Baby Doc and other interim military dicta-
tors were overthrown, Haiti enjoyed a relatively peaceful eight
months during the presidency of the democratically elected Jean-Ber-
trand Aristide. 30 In September of 1991, however, Aristide fell victim
to a military-led coup, and the poor Haitian masses once again set sail
for foreign shores in astounding numbers.31
In order to cope with the overflow of Haitian refugees washing up
on American beaches throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the
United States enacted the so-called Haitian Program. This section will
outline the formal international and domestic legal protection for ref-
25. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 318.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra notes 287-343 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 317-31 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 328 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
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ugees known as "non-refoulement." When the Haitian Program is
then explained against the backdrop of these legal obligations, the
controversy over American policies is apparent.
A. General Refugee Law
Before examining the details of the Haitian Program, it is necessary
to review some general principles of international human rights law,
specifically treaty law, and their effects on domestic jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most effective means of implementing international
human rights law is through domestic judicial and legislative sys-
tems.32 States33 can incorporate treaty law into their domestic systems
in either or both of two main ways: the monist and dualist approaches.
States following the monist approach simply accept international law
as their domestic law, directly incorporating international legal obliga-
tions into their own legal systems.34 Under the dualist approach, how-
ever, international law concerns only a State's relationship with other
governments.35 In other words, for international law to have any do-
mestic effect, it must be specifically incorporated by national
legislation.36
The United States follows a combination of both approaches. 37 The
Constitution provides that treaties are considered the supreme law of
the land,38 indicating adherence to the monist model by directly incor-
porating international treaty law as a part of domestic law. The doc-
trine of self-executing treaties first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall in Foster v. Neilson,39 however, renders the United States
approach somewhat dualist in practice. 40 This doctrine provides that a
self-executing treaty is to be regarded "as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legis-
lative provision. ' '41 Its practical effect is that non-self-executing trea-
ties do not independently create a cause of action in United States
32. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 2, at 21.
33. "States" refers to the individual nations that make up the United Nations. Id. at 2-3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
39. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
40. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 2, at 22.
41. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
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courts.42 Thus, Congress must adopt implementing legislation that ex-
pressly embodies a particular treaty provision.43
Naturally, conflicts arise between international and domestic laws.
Where a treaty conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution
prevails.44 When a treaty conflicts with federal legislation, the last in
time prevails.45 Typically, however, when a federal statute conflicts
with pre-existing treaty obligations, courts will presume that Congress
did not intend to override treaty provisions and will endeavor to con-
strue them as consistent with each other, absent clear evidence to the
contrary.46
Using these guidelines, United States legislators and courts attempt
to decipher American obligations under international law. These
guidelines also provide the context for the following discussion of in-
ternational and domestic instruments.
1. The International Protection of Refugees
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 47 ("the Conven-
tion") was entered into force in 1954.48 Although the United States
was a signatory to the Convention, it did not ratify the treaty.49 The
United States did accede, however, to the subsequent Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees 50 ("the Protocol"), which incorporated
much of the Convention.51 The Convention protected only those per-
42. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). Newman and Weissbrodt discuss the
various standards for determining which treaties are self-executing, noting that Chief Justice
Marshall initially emphasized the language of a treaty to decide if it was sufficiently definite and
compulsory to be self-executing. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 2, at 22. Marshall later
changed the standard, using instead the intent of the parties as a determining factor. Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 589. Recently, however, most human rights treaties are accompanied
by a declaration pronouncing them non-self-executing. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra
note 2, at 22; see also JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW As LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
51-64 (1996)(discussing the various criteria that courts have developed for determining whether
or not a treaty is self-executing).
43. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 2, at 22.
44. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1956); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
45. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 n.34; RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 115 cmt. a.
46. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804); RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 44, § 115 cmt. a.
47. July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention].
48. Id.
49. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 169 n.19 (1993).
50. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter Protocol].
51. Id. Although the United States is not a party to the Convention, it acceded to many of its
provisions, including those under Article 33, when it ratified the Protocol. Id. The Protocol was
not ratified by the United States until November 1, 1968, id., and thus was not in effect in the
United States until that time. Because the Protocol is the binding instrument, the author will
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sons who became refugees as a result of events occurring before Janu-
ary 1, 1951; however, the Protocol covers all refugee situations
irrespective of that date.5 2 By acceding to the Protocol, the United
States bound itself to many of the Convention's provisions. 53
In order to fall under the provisions of the Protocol, one's status
must comport with its definition of "refugee" as adopted from the
Convention. 54 Article 1 of the Convention defines refugee as follows:
[A]ny person who... (2) owing to well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a na-
tionality and being outside the country of his former habitual resi-
dence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it. 55
After establishing the individuals protected by the treaty, the Con-
vention spells out the circumstances under which refugees may or may
not be returned to their home countries. Article 33 provides in rele-
vant part that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler')
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion. '' 56 The second section of Article 33 carves out the only
exception to the general prohibition of return, providing that such
protection cannot "be claimed by a refugee whom there are reason-
able grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to that country. '57 By
ratifying the Protocol, the United States agreed to abide by its provi-
sions, including the obligation of non-refoulement.
simply refer to it throughout this Comment in order to be consistent. The Protocol, however,
incorporates much of the Convention, including Article 33, the article at issue.
52. Id. at preamble.
53. Sale, 509 U.S. at 169 n.19 (citing Protocol, supra note 50, art. 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. at 268).
54. Protocol, supra note 50, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (referring to and
revising the Convention's definition).
55. Convention, supra note 47, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
56. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. This essay
will refer to the obligation spelled out in Article 33 as the obligation of "non-refoulement" or
"non-return."
57. Id. art. 33 (2), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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2. The Inter-American System
In addition to its obligations under the Protocol, the United States
also maintains more regional human rights responsibilities as a mem-
ber of the Organization of American States ("OAS"). An express
purpose of the Charter of the OAS is to effectuate regional obliga-
tions arising under the Charter of the Untied Nations.58
Pursuant to this objective, the OAS created the the Commission in
1959.59 The Commission "is an organ of the Organization of the
American States, created to promote the observance and defense of
human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization
in this matter. '60 The Commission's mandate consists mostly of mak-
ing recommendations to member governments regarding appropriate
measures to ensure the protection of basic human rights, and submit-
ting an annual report documenting its suggestions to the OAS General
Assembly.61
The Statute of the Commission defines human rights as those rights
set forth by the American Convention on Human Rights62 and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 63 ("the Amer-
ican Declaration") in relation to the state parties thereto.64 Because
the United States has not ratified the American Convention, the
American Declaration's definition of human rights prevail in matters
before the Commission. 65
3. United States Refugee Law
In accordance with the provisions set out by the Protocol, the
United States established its own laws for the protection of refugees. 66
Prior to 1980, § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
("INA") provided that:
58. Organization of American States Charter, April 30, 1948, art. 4, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 52 ("The
Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the principles on which it is
founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims
the following essential purposes.").
59. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing the origins of the
Commission).
60. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447, 9th Sess.
art. 1(1) (Oct. 1979).
61. Id. art. 18, at 5-6.
62. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
63. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. res. XXX, Bogota (1948)
[hereinafter American Declaration].
64. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1(2).
65. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550, 597 OEA/ser. L./V./11.84, doc. 51 (1997).
66. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1986) (discussing the legislative intent
behind the Refugee Act of 1980).
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The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to physical persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he
deem to be necessary for such reason.67
The INA defined "alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of
the United States."68
After the 1968 accession to the Protocol, Congress eventually began
entertaining legislation to conform the INA to provisions of the Proto-
col. Pursuant to this goal, Congress amended the INA through the
Refugee Act of 1980.69 The Refugee Act made several significant
changes. First, it added "refugee" to the list of definitions:70
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity.., and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that coun-
try because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of ... membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 71
This definition intentionally mirrors its counterpart in the United Na-
tions Protocol.72
Additionally, § 243(h)(1) of the INA, as amended by the Refugee
Act, removed the discretionary language of the previous version. Sec-
tion 243(h)(1) now provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he Attorney
General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would
be threatened in such country on account of ... political opinion. '73
Not only does the amendment remove the Attorney General's discre-
tion, it also eliminates the words "within the United States" from the
original section,74 apparently broadening the geographical scope of
the provision. The language in § 243(h), was meant to be a virtual
reproduction of the "non-refoulement" section of Article 33 of the
Protocol.75 Indeed, the proposed amendment of § 243(h) originally
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. 11964).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1994).
69. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980); see Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
71. Id.
72. Compare with the Protocol's definition, supra text accompanying note 55. See Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37 (summarizing congressional intent).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. III 1988). Compare with the original version, supra text ac-
companying note 67. Throughout this essay, "section 243(h)" refers to the amended form of the
section, unless indicated otherwise.
74. See supra text accompanying note 67 for comparison with original.
75. See supra text accompanying note 56 for comparison. The Court in INS v. Stevic con-
ceded that the Refugee Act aimed to conform United States law to its international obligations
[Vol. 48:559
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provided that forcible repatriation of refugees would be prohibited
"unless deportation or return would be permitted under the terms of
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 76
4. Summary
Under the Convention's non-refoulement clause in Article 33, refu-
gees have a near absolute right to seek asylum, which necessarily en-
tails the right to a hearing in order to determine refugee status. The
United States, in acceding to the Protocol, agreed to the obligation of
non-refoulement. This obligation gained the force of domestic law
through the Refugee Act of 1980.77 Additionally, the United States is
bound to regional compliance with the obligation of non-return via its
responsibilities as a State Party to the American Declaration.
B. The Haitian Program and Resulting Litigation
In spite of the formal protections for refugees provided by the Pro-
tocol and the INA, the United States typically has not afforded Hai-
tians the same amount of protection as most other refugee groups.78
The flood of refugees fleeing the Duvalier regimes throughout the
1970s caused the INS to adopt special procedures to deal exclusively
with the Haitian refugees. 79 Although this Haitian Program was sup-
posedly carried out in accordance with all international and domestic
obligations, a brief review of the Program and related policies indi-
cates that basic refugee protections did not apply to Haitians en route
to America.
1. Enacting the Haitian Program
The first, and perhaps most important step, in the Haitian Program
focused on the type of persecution to which the Haitians were sub-
jected. The INS usually claimed that Haitians were economic refugees
fleeing the abysmal economic situation in their homeland, 80 and thus
under the Protocol. 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984). The legislative history of the Refugee Act indi-
cates that one of its overarching purposes was to render the INA's provisions "consistent with
our international obligations under the United Nations Convention and Protocol." 126 CONG.
REc. 4498, 4500 (1980).
76. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 29 (1979).
77. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980).
78. See infra notes 362-81 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
80. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1982) (modifying Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980)). "One July 1978 report from the
Intelligence Division of INS to the Associate Director of Enforcement advised in absolute terms
that the Haitians were 'economic' and not political refugees." Id.; see 126 CONG. REC. at 29,606.
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not entitled to asylum. The characterization of the type of persecution
Haitians suffered is of paramount importance. If a Haitian is fleeing
for economic reasons, as the INS routinely assumed, then she is not
entitled to asylum.81 Only political refugees can claim a right to seek
asylum.82
The INS's assumptions regarding Haitian refugees reflected a
broader policy that pervaded its asylum processing programs. In gen-
eral, the policy provided that those individuals fleeing client regimes
of the United States government were assumed to be economic refu-
gees.83 The Duvalier regimes were such regimes,84 which almost auto-
matically and without question meant that individuals fleeing the
country were considered economic refugees by the INS, regardless of
reality. The flip side of this policy established a practice of admitting
refugees from communist countries and other enemy regimes at a
much higher rate as obvious political refugees.85
The INS adjusted this ideology-based program to accommodate the
mass exodus of Haitians, thus earning the title of the "Haitian Pro-
gram. ' 86 By June of 1978, almost seven thousand Haitian deportation
cases were pending in the INS's Miami office.87 The reason for the
enormous backlog, the acting District Director admitted, was that INS
officials in Miami "were not doing [their] job."'88
To expedite the Haitian asylum claims, the INS decided to suspend
certain regulations.89 The process of hearing Haitian asylum claims
was accelerated by assigning more judges with instructions to increase
"productivity." 90 The notion that the Haitians were "threatening the
community's well-being-socially and economically" served as a con-
81. Note that "refugee" is defined by the INA (as well as the Protocol) in terms of political
persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1994). Persons fleeing for economic reasons cannot seek the
protection of § 243(h) under the current definition because such persons are not explicitly in-
cluded in the definition. Id.
82. Political refugees, contrary to economic refugees, are specifically included under the defi-
nition of the statute. Id.
83. See 126 CONG. REc. at 29,605. Conyers criticizes "the favorable treatment, historically,
toward refugees from Communist countries versus the restrictive treatment against refugees
from right-wing governments allied to our own" such as Haiti's government was at the time. Id.
84. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
85. See 126 CONG. REC. at 29,605.
86. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1030.
90. Id. "Among the specifics set forth were the assignment of additional immigration judges
to Miami, the instructions to immigration judges to effect a three-fold increase in productivity,
and orders for the blanket issuance of show cause orders in all pending Haitian deportation
cases." Id.
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stant reminder of the urgency to deport them.91 Immigration judges
held up to eighty deportation hearings per day.92 The INS handled
asylum interviews at the rate of forty per day, which typically meant
only fifteen minutes of substantive dialogue per individual.93 With
only twelve attorneys to assist the thousands of Haitians, most refu-
gees proceeded without counsel, 94 (a fact of which the INS was well
aware). 95 The Haitian Program prompted one judge to declare that
the "uniform rejection of their claims demonstrates a profound igno-
rance, if not an intentional disregard, of the conditions in Haiti." 96
Still, Haitians were inevitably labeled economic refugees, and the Hai-
tian Program proceeded without delay.
These INS policies resulted in the Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith97
litigation. In 1979, the Haitian Refugee Center ("HRC"), on behalf of
4,000 Haitians seeking political asylum in south Florida, filed a com-
plaint challenging the INS program for processing Haitian asylum
seekers. 98 It argued that the program aimed "to achieve expedited
mass deportation of Haitian nationals" without regard to the validity
of their individual asylum claims. 99 Through the inadequacies of the
program, the HRC argued, the defendants engaged in unlawful dis-
crimination based on national origin and denied due process rights to
the Haitian complainants. 100 The district court found that the pro-
91. Id.
92. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031. There were only one to ten hearings per day prior to the Haitian
Program. Id.
93. Id. "Prior to the program such interviews had lasted an hour and a half; during the pro-
gram the officer devoted approximately one-half hour to each Haitian." Id. Given the time for
communication through interpreters, one-half hour meant only fifteen minutes of substantive
dialogue per individual. Id.
94. Id. "It was not unusual for an attorney representing Haitians to have three hearings at the
same hour in different buildings; this kind of scheduling conflict was a daily occurrence for attor-
neys throughout the Haitian program." Id. The following is a typical Haitian asylum hearing:
Applicant made a motion for depositions and interrogatories, and that motion was de-
nied. Motion for simultaneous translation - this motion was overruled or denied. Ap-
plicant made an oral motion for a continuance. That motion was ... that motion was
also denied. I conclude that the applicant has failed to establish that he will be perse-
cuted if deported to Haiti because of his race, religion, nationality, or membership in a
particular social group or political opinion. It is ordered that the application for polit-
ical asylum and/or withholding of deportation be denied. It is further ordered that he
be deported, excluded and deported from the United States to Haiti - on the line for
signature, Martin F. (inaudible), immigration judge.
Videotape: Bitter Cane (Haiti Films 1983) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).
95. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1029.
96. Id. at 1042 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 457 (S.D. Fla. 1980)).
97. Id. at 1023 (modifying Haitian Refugee Ctr., 503 F. Supp. 442).
98. Id. at 1026.
99. Id.
100. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
gram "violated the Constitution, the immigration statutes, and inter-
national agreements, INS regulations and INS operating
procedures. '" 10 1 Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants to es-
tablish a program that would sufficiently protect the Haitians' right to
seek refuge in the United States, enjoining the defendants from hear-
ing any more Haitian asylum claims or deporting any Haitians until a
program was approved by the court.10 2 The appellate court affirmed
the district court's judgment. l0 3
2. Reagan's Interdiction Program
As the flow of Haitian refugees continued into the early 1980s and
in light of Smith, a new, more direct approach to excluding the refu-
gees from American shores was added to the Haitian Program. 10 4 In
1981 President Reagan entered into an agreement with the Haitian
government authorizing the United States Coast Guard to intercept
vessels that were illegally transporting undocumented aliens to Amer-
ican shores.'0 5 Both sides agreed to prosecute illegal traffickers, but
the Haitian government agreed not to prosecute interdicted Haitians
for illegal departure. 0 6
Pursuant to this agreement with the Duvalier dictatorship, Presi-
dent Reagan issued a proclamation classifying the flight of Haitians as
''a serious national problem detrimental to the interests of the United
States."' 10 7 His Executive Order required the Coast Guard to inter-
cept vessels carrying the illegal aliens and return them to their point of
origin. 0 8 Significantly, however, Reagan's order provided "that no
person who is a refugee will be returned without his consent."'10 9
The treatment of Haitians under the INS procedures carried to the
Coast Guard's treatment pursuant to Reagan's interdiction program.
Although the order ostensibly comported with international obliga-
tions under Article 33, in practice the interdiction program was not so
benign. The Coast Guard employed inadequate interviewing proce-
101. Id. at 1027.
102. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1027.
103. Id.
104. Though typically not considered a part of the Haitian Program, the Executive Orders
worked in conjunction with INS policies and served much the same purpose. As such, the au-
thor includes them under the "Haitian Program" rubric.
105. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 160 (1993).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1981-1983)).
108. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1981-1983)).
109. Id. at 160-61 (citing Exec. Order No. 12324, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1981-1983)). The Court also
noted that this provision was included in order to conform the order to the obligations under the
Protocol. Id. at 161 n.9.
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dures on its ships to determine the refugee status of those fleeing Ha-
iti,110 invariably concluding that all of them were merely economic
refugees. From 1981 to 1991, about 24,600 Haitians were intercepted
at sea pursuant to the interdiction program."' Of those, the Coast
Guard found that only twenty-eight had credible asylum claims and
brought them to the United States for asylum hearings.112 The rest
were returned to Port-au-Prince in accordance with the agreement
with Baby Doc." 3 It is significant, of course, that the average member
of the Haitian citizenry endured political persecution on a daily basis
during this time frame. 114
Naturally, the new interdiction program met resistance. Once
again, the HRC filed a lawsuit challenging the program. 15 The com-
plaint attacked the program on the grounds that it violated the rights
of Haitians under the INA, deprived interdicted Haitians of rights and
liberties guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
failed to satisfy the non-refoulement obligations under the United Na-
tions Convention, and violated the extradition agreement between
Haiti and the United States.116 The district court dismissed the com-
plaint, holding that the plaintiffs stated no cause of action upon which
the court could grant relief."l 7 The decision was affirmed on
appeal.118
3. The Interdiction Program Under Bush
The fall of Baby Doc in 1986 and the rise of Haiti's first democrati-
cally elected president rendered the interdiction program unnecessary
for a few short months. 1 9 The 1991 ouster of the democratically
elected Aristide, however, ushered in a reign of terror that was sadis-
tic even by Haitian standards, 20 thus resulting in a deluge of Haitians
seeking refuge overseas.' 21 In the wake of the mass exodus, the Coast
110. Id. at 161-62.
111. U.S. Human Rights Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Legislation and Nat'l Sec.
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations H.R., 102d Cong. 7 (1992) (statement of Harold J.
Johnson) [hereinafter House Subcomm.].
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
115. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985).
116. Id. at 1401.
117. Id. at 1406.
118. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
119. See infra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
121. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 163 (1993) (noting that the Coast
Guard intercepted over 34,000 Haitians during the first six months after the coup).
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Guard announced that it would resume the interdiction program
under the Bush administration. 122
The day after the Coast Guard's announcement, the HRC filed an-
other complaint challenging the program in Haitian Refugee Center v.
Baker.123 The plaintiffs argued that the interdiction program violated
the Protocol as well as the protections set forth in the INA.124 The
district court enjoined the program, 125 but the Eleventh Circuit dis-
solved the injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dis-
miss the claims that were based on the Protocol. 26 On remand, the
plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order, 127 and the defend-
ants appealed. 128 The Eleventh Circuit again disagreed and ultimately
held that the INA, even as amended, only applied to aliens within the
United States or at United States borders or ports of entry.129 Thus,
the interdiction program was found to be valid.
While the Baker decision was still pending, the Haitian Centers
Council ("HCC") filed another complaint, initially arguing that the
interdiction program and the refugee processing on Guantanamo Na-
val Base did not adequately protect the Haitians' statutory and treaty
rights. 130 In Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, the court
granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction requiring the defend-
ants to supply Haitians with counsel during the screening process on
Guantanamo.' 3 ' The Supreme Court stayed that order. 132 After the
final result in Baker, and while the defendants' appeal was pending in
McNary, President Bush issued a new Executive Order. 133 His Order
differed slightly, but significantly, from President Reagan's Order.
The Bush Order expressly declared that Article 33 did not extend to
persons located outside United States territory. 34 Additionally, his
Order provided that "the Attorney General, in his unreviewable dis-
cretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be returned
122. Id. at 162.
123. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
124. Id. at 1553.
125. Id. at 1578.
126. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1991).
127. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1579, 1580 (1991).
128. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685 (11th Cir. 1991).
129. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510 (11th Cir. 1992).
130. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 807 F. Supp. 928, 929-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
131. Id. at 930-31.
132. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992).
133. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1993).
134. Id. "Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
do[es] not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United States." Id.
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without his consent,"1135 whereas Reagan's program required the Coast
Guard to refrain from returning a refugee without first obtaining her
consent.136 Finally, the Bush Order did not allow for even cursory
refugee hearings on Coast Guard cutters, thus eliminating the oppor-
tunity for refugee status determinations. 137
Bush's interdiction program proved as effective as his predecessor's.
Between September 30, 1991, (the date of the coup), and April 7,
1992, an estimated 18,095 Haitians were interdicted. 138 Of these,
about 10,149 were sent back to Haiti without an interview of any
kind. 39 The remaining Haitians were either brought to the United
States for more asylum interviews, taken to Guantanamo Bay, or de-
posited in another country. 14° Of those who underwent screening pro-
cedures on Guantanamo Bay, an estimated 40% were found to have
credible claims. 141
The HCC immediately amended its complaint to challenge Bush's
Order, but the district court denied its request for a temporary re-
straining order.142 The court of appeals reversed that decision, hold-
ing that the interdiction program violated § 243(h) of the INA,143 and
defendants appealed.
4. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,144 the plaintiffs, Haitian
Centers Council, first argued that the interdiction program violated
§ 243(h) of the INA, which explicitly provides that the Attorney Gen-
eral shall not deport or return any alien to a country where such alien
will be the victim of political persecution. 145 By removing the words
"within the United States" from the original section, plaintiffs argued,
Congress meant to broaden the scope of § 243(h)(1) to protect all
aliens fleeing persecution, thus giving it extraterritorial effect. 146 The
135. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 204 (emphasis added). Bush's order
revoked and replaced Reagan's order. Id. at 171. It also provided that the program should not
be "construed to require any procedures to determine whether a person is a refugee." Exec.
Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. at 304.
136. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
137. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. at 304; see supra note 135.
138. House Subcomm., supra note 111, at 7.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 7-8.
141. Id. at 8. These Haitians were screened in, but not "accepted." Id.
142. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 807 F. Supp. 928, 933-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
143. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 1992).
144. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
145. Id. at 170-71.
146. Id.
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plaintiffs argued that the plain language of § 243(h)(1) prohibited the
implementation of Bush's interdiction program. 47
The plaintiffs further contended that Article 33 applied extraterrito-
rially. 148 Although the Protocol had previously been determined not
self-executing, they argued that the history of the Refugee Act of 1980
clearly indicated Congress' intention to conform the INA to the provi-
sions of the Protocol. 149 Because Article 33 applies extraterritorially,
the plaintiffs argued, § 243(h)(1) also applies extraterritorially a50
The Court also reviewed the lower court's holding that the term
"Attorney General" was meant to apply to the President as well,
thereby prohibiting the issuance of his Executive Order.' 51 The court
of appeals held that the Attorney General almost always acts as an
agent of the President and exercises her powers at the behest of the
President in matters regarding immigration. 152 As such, it deter-
mined, prohibiting the Attorney General from forcibly repatriating
refugees with credible asylum claims also prohibits the President from
doing so. 153
The defendants reasserted their argument that the plain language of
§ 243(h) dictates that it applies only to the Attorney General; thus,
only the Attorney General is prohibited from returning the aliens, not
the President. 54 Additionally, they argued that the entire INA, when
read with the legislative history of the 1980 amendments, reveals that
§ 243(h) was not intended to apply outside of United States terri-
tory. 155 The defendants also argued that the negotiating history of the
Protocol clearly indicates that Article 33 does not apply extraterritori-
ally either.156
In finding for the defendants, the Court determined that the INA's
non-return provision applied only to the Attorney General.157 It rea-
soned that, because other sections of the INA mention the President,
the INA would have expressly prohibited the President from re-
turning refugees, rather than just the Attorney General, if it meant to
extend the prohibition to him. 5 8
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sale, 509 U.S. at 170-71.
151. Id. at 171.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 168-69.
155. Id. at 171.
156. Sale, 509 U.S. at 171.
157. Id. at 171-72.
158. Id. at 173-74.
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It also found persuasive the defendants' argument regarding the in-
terpretation of the 1980 amendment to the INA that removed the
words "within the United States." 159 The Court noted that it
presumes that acts of Congress only apply within the United States.160
The Court relied on the Leng May Ma v. Barber161 decision to deci-
pher the significance of removing the territorial limitation from the
original section.162
The Leng May Ma Court explained that an alien who is legally in
the United States is "within the United States," while one who is phys-
ically, but not legally, present in the country is not "within the United
States."' 63 The latter is an "excludable" alien, and the former is a
"deportable" alien.' 64 The Court in Leng May Ma noted that "deport-
able" aliens traditionally have been afforded more protection by
United States law, while "excludable" aliens did not receive such
protection.1 65
Relying on the distinction between "deportable" and "excludable"
aliens articulated in Leng May Ma, the Sale Court held that, by re-
moving "within the United States" from the original version of
§ 243(h), Congress merely extended to "excludable" aliens the same
protections afforded to "deportable" aliens under the INA. 166 Thus,
the removal of the words was not intended to extend protection be-
yond United States borders. 167
Further, the Court held that the negotiating history and language of
Article 33 indicates that it does not apply extraterritorially either.' 68
Thus, the Court determined that the statute and the treaty are wholly
consistent with each other in their territorial limitations.' 69
Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that both the INA and Article
33 apply extraterritorially °70 He found the majority's reliance on the
presumption against extraterritoriality inappropriate.' 71 Additionally,
he noted that, in light of the territorial restriction throughout other
sections of the INA, the removal of "within the United States" was
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
162. Sale, 509 U.S. at 172.
163. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187-90.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Sale, 509 U.S. at 175-76.
167. Id. at 177.
168. Id. at 179-87.
169. Id. at 188.
170. Id. at 188-208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 205-07.
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clearly meant to remove the territorial restriction of § 243(h). 172 He
rejected the majority's Leng May Ma argument. 173
Justice Blackmun discovered no references to Leng May Ma in the
negotiating history of the Refugee Act of 1980.174 He also noted that
references to the Protocol permeated the history of the amend-
ments. 175 He relied on these references in determining that the Refu-
gee Act conformed the INA to the provisions of the Protocol. 176 He
contended that, had the majority employed the standard rules of
treaty construction, it would have necessarily reached the conclusion
that Article 33 did in fact apply extraterritorially. 177
5. Proceedings Before the Commission
Although the Sale decision effectively ended litigation over Haitian
interdiction in United States courts, it did not terminate the inquiry
into the extraterritorial nature of Article 33. After the final decision
in Sale, the Commission agreed to hear a similar petition brought by
many of the same complainants. 178 Although the Commission is a re-
gional body that usually deals with regional human rights instruments,
such as the American Declaration, it found it necessary to address the
extraterritorial applicability of Article 33 of the Convention. 179
The Commission conducted its deliberations by inviting both parties
to submit their understandings of the relevant provisions of the Amer-
ican Declaration. 180 Specifically, the Commission accepted interpreta-
tions of Article XXVII,181 which provides that "[e]very person has the
right, in case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and
receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of
each country and with international agreements.' 1 82 The pertinent in-
ternational provision, of course, is Article 33.183 The United States
government, the defendant, contended that the Supreme Court's
172. Sale, 509 U.S. at 204-05.
173. Id. at 203-05.
174. Id. at 203.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 190-98.
178. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550, 556 OEA/ser. L./V./11.84, doc. 51 (1997).
179. Id. at 599. It is important to note that any decision of the Commission has no obligatory
power in international law. NEWMAN & WEISSBROOT, supra note 2, at 142. It is not within the
Commission's mandate to pass on domestic laws of nations in and of themselves. Id. Rather,
the Commission only articulates international obligations and recommends that nations comply
with those obligations. Id.
180. Case 10.675, Inter-Am C.H.R. at 565.
181. American Declaration, supra note 63, at art, XXVII.
182. Id.
183. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 599.
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opinion in Sale already determined that the interdiction program was
consistent with both domestic and international law.184
The Commission ultimately found that the United States was in vio-
lation of several articles of the American Declaration. 18 5 Signifi-
cantly, it concluded that the United States violated Article XXVII. 186
Expressly rejecting the Supreme Court's determination that Article 33
does not apply extraterritorially, the Commission held that the in-
terdiction program violated the obligation of non-refoulement and,
thus, Article XXVII. 187 The Commission determined that its decision
be published in the Commission's Annual Report and it recom-
mended that the United States pay adequate compensation to the
victims. 188
6. Summary
The Haitian Program elicited substantial litigation. Most com-
plaints challenging the interdiction aspect of the program were unsuc-
cessful. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,189 the Supreme Court
made the final decision that the interdiction programs violated neither
the INA nor Article 33.190 In reaching this conclusion, the Court held
that neither provision meant to extend protection to refugees outside
of American territorial waters. 91 In an opinion handed down three
years later, the Commission on expressly disagreed with the Supreme
Court's holding finding the interdiction program a violation of the
United States' obligation of non-refoulement.1 92
II. THE ROLE OF RACE IN HAITIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The controversy over the decision in Sale focused mostly on the
American government's potential violation of international and do-
mestic law. Although the Commission took a broader approach in
determining the American government's compliance with its interna-
tional obligations, its decision was strictly limited in scope. Not as
widely recognized, let alone criticized, was the advantage gained by
184. Id.
185. Id. at 609.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 599.
188. Id. at 609.
189. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
190. Id. at 171.
191. Id. at 171-76. This conclusion was determined in spite of the removal of "within the
United States" by the Refugee Act of 1980. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
107 (1980).
192. Sale, 509 U.S. at 171.
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the United States through the forcible repatriation of Haitian refu-
gees. When viewed in light of the history of Haitian-American rela-
tions, the racist thrust of Haitian Program is revealed. Only after
considering the role of race in the program can one accurately assess
the objectives and impact of American treatment of Haitian refugees.
A. A Critical Analysis of the Sale Decision
Because the Sale case represents the culmination of litigation over
the Haitian Program-specifically the interdiction program--in
United States courts, it provides the starting point for the following
analysis. This subsection will first focus on the Court's argument
against the extraterritorial applicability of the INA and the Protocol.
It will then examine the Commission's assessment of the interdiction
programs' legality.
1. Non-return and the INA
The first important step in this analysis requires a look at the scope
of the INA as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. In Sale, the
Court held that the amended version of the INA does not extend be-
yond United States territory to cover refugees on the high seas.193 In
ruling against its extraterritorial application, the Court relied heavily
on the presumption that acts of Congress ordinarily do not apply
outside the borders of the United States.194 As the Court conceded,
however, the presumption is applied primarily to avoid conflicts be-
tween the laws of the United States and those of foreign nations.195
No such risk was involved under these circumstances. Refusing to re-
turn Haitian nationals to their tumultuous homeland, as is required by
§ 243(h), would not have conflicted with the laws of other nations.
The Court rejected this argument, however, relying on a footnote in
Smith v. United States.196 This "well-established" precedent, articu-
lated only a few months before the decision in Sale, concluded that
"the presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the
least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress generally leg-
islates with domestic concerns in mind."'1 97 While the Court's reliance
on a footnote of a recent opinion might seem a somewhat dubious
foundation for invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality,
one need not be overly concerned about the Court's rationale on this
193. Id. at 173-77.
194. Id. at 173.
195. Id. at 173-74.
196. Id. at 174 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 206-07 n.5 (1993)).
197. Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5.
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point. Perhaps even more remarkable is the Court's disregard for the
"commonsense notion" that the very nature of refugee law is interna-
tional. 198 Additionally, the presumption applies only where congres-
sional intent is unexpressed. 199 Here, Congress removed the
territorial restriction from § 243(h), leaving little doubt about its in-
tentions. A further look behind the history of the Refugee Act of
1980 is instructive.
The Refugee Act deleted the words '"within the United States"
from § 243(h) of the INA.20 0 It also removed the discretionary lan-
guage in this section, expressly prohibiting the forcible return of any
alien to a country where the alien would be subject to persecution for
the enumerated reasons, including political persecution.20' On its
face, the amendment flatly prohibits, without territorial restriction,
the precise activity that the interdiction program required. The Court,
however, remained unconvinced by this argument. Relying on the
Leng May Ma decision, the Court determined that the amended ver-
sion of § 243(h) extended to "excludable" aliens the same protections
afforded to "deportable" aliens under the INA.20 2 It pointed to lan-
guage in the legislative history which provided that the amendment
required the Attorney General to withhold deportation of aliens in
both exclusion and deportation hearings.20 3 More precisely, the Court
used the Leng May Ma distinction to narrow the meaning of the word
"return" in § 243(h). It reasoned that by adding "return" and remov-
ing "within the United States," Congress extended protection to both
types of aliens.20 4
The Court rightly pointed out that Congress was aware that the
amendment erased the distinction between "deportable" and "exclud-
able" aliens, extending its protection to both.205 It is peculiar, how-
ever, that the Leng May Ma decision shows up nowhere in the
legislative history of the Refugee Act,20 6 though references to the Pro-
tocol permeate these documents.20 7 Indeed, the provisions of the Pro-
tocol, specifically Article 33, inspired the 1980 amendments.208 Not
only did Congress intend to define "refugee" in conformity with the
198. Sale, 509 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 205-06.
200. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
202. Sale, 509 U.S. at 176.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 177.
205. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
206. Sale, 509 U.S. at 202-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. Id.
208. Id; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
19981
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
definition contained in the Protocol, 20 9 but it also aimed to harmonize
American law regarding the deportation of refugees with the obliga-
tion of non-refoulement arising under the Protocol. 210 Although pur-
suing this goal ultimately eliminated the archaic distinction between
"deportable" and "excludable" aliens, the overriding purpose of the
Refugee Act was to render the INA's provisions "consistent with our
international obligations under the United Nations Convention and
Protocol." 211
It is important to note the proposed version of § 243(h) in the Sen-
ate conference report on the Refugee Act,212 the report on which the
Court so heavily relied in asserting the amended form of § 243(h),
functioned primarily to remove the "deportable"/"excludable" alien
distinction. This proposed version contained all of the changes that
would eventually form the final amended version of § 243(h). At the
end of the section, however, it added the words "unless deportation or
return would be permitted under the terms of the United Nations Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. '213 Although the language
was not kept in the final version, it serves as a rather convincing indi-
cation that Congress intended to conform § 243(h) to the provisions of
the Protocol. Indeed, because congressional intent was clearly ex-
pressed, the Court's reliance on the presumption against extraterrito-
riality was misplaced.
2. Article 33 and Extraterritoriality
The Court recognized that bringing "excludable" aliens within the
protection of the INA was not the sole purpose of the changes made
by the Refugee Act.214 If it determined that the amended form of
§ 243(h) merely extended protection to previously excluded groups of
aliens, rather than conform United States law to obligations arising
under the Protocol, then there would have been no occasion to pass
on the extraterritorial nature of Article 33.215 Indeed, at least one
court has indicated that the provisions of the Protocol are not self-
executing. 216 As such, it does not give rise to a cause of action in a
209. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1986).
210. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 418, 421 (1984); see 126 CONG. REC. 4498, 4450 (1980).
211. 126 CONG. REc. at 4450.
212. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 29 (1979).
213. Id.
214. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177-78 (1993)("Nevertheless, because
the history of the 1980 Act does disclose a general intent to conform our law to Article 33 of the
Convention."). Id.
215. Id. at 178.
216. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 1982).
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United States court. Nevertheless, because the Refugee Act sought to
effectuate the treaty's obligations, specifically that of non-refoule-
ment, it was necessary for the Court to determine the extraterritorial
application of Article 33. If Article 33 applies extraterritorially, then
so does § 243(h). 217
At the start, the Court mostly engaged in wordplay in its analysis of
Article 33. It first argued that, taken as a whole, the Article could not
have been intended to apply extraterritorially.2 18 Paragraph 1 of the
Article provides, in relevant part, that no contracting State shall re-
turn a refugee in any manner whatsoever to a territory where that
refugee's life or freedom would be threatened for the enumerated rea-
sons, subject only to the exception spelled out in Paragraph 2.219 Par-
agraph 2 excepts from the obligations of Paragraph 1 situations where
a refugee constitutes "a danger to the security of the country in which
he is" or where the refugee poses a threat to the community of a coun-
try.220 The Court found that if Paragraph 1 applied to the high seas,
then countries could not invoke the second paragraph's exception be-
cause an alien on the high seas is in no country at all.2 21 In the Court's
view, this would create "an absurd anomaly: Dangerous aliens on the
high seas would be entitled to the benefits of 33.1 while those residing
in the country that sought to expel them would not. ' 222 Rather than
falling victim to such flawed rationale, the Court found it "more rea-
sonable to assume" that Paragraph 2 was limited to those already
present within a country because it was understood that Paragraph 1
implied no extraterritorial obligations.223
Justice Blackmun deftly dismantled the majority's argument in his
dissenting opinion. He maintained that a reasonable decision to allow
nations to deport criminal aliens in no way betrayed an intent on the
part of the signatories "to permit the apprehension and return of non-
criminal aliens who have not entered their territories, and who may
have no desire ever to enter it."224 On its face, the goal of Article 33 is
to prohibit the return of refugees seized anywhere while permitting
the expulsion or return of a small class of refugees within a country's
217. Sale, 509 U.S. at 178.
218. Id. at 179.
219. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (2), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
220. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176 (emphasis
added); see supra text accompanying note 57.
221. Sale, 509 U.S. at 179.
222. Id. at 179-80.
223. Id. at 180.
224. Id. at 193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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territory. As Justice Blackmun reasoned, non-return is the rule, and
Paragraph 2 provides the only exception. 225
Rather than creating an absurd anomaly, the territorial restriction
in Paragraph 2 indicates the intention that Article 33 applies extrater-
ritorially. Just as "Congress knows how to place the high seas within
the jurisdictional reach of a statute" if it so desires, 226 the drafters of
the Convention presumably knew how to limit the territorial applica-
tion of the protection offered by Article 33. Not surprisingly, Para-
graph 2 does in fact provide a territorial limitation, demonstrating that
such a capability was indeed within the realm of skills of the draft-
ers.227 Had the drafters intended to limit the geographic applicability
of Paragraph 1, they would have expressed it in the provision. Far
from constituting affirmative evidence, the majority's argument
merely offered an elaborate diversion from the plain language of Arti-
cle 33.
The Court also pondered the meaning of the word "return" within
the context of Paragraph 1 of Article 33. The majority once again
relied on the distinction spelled out in the Leng May Ma decision and
determined that "return" (refouler) merely extended protection to the
previously excluded class of aliens at the threshold of entry to a coun-
try.228 The Court's rationale here is fantastic. When interpreting "re-
turn" in § 243(h), the Court ignored Article 33.229 Instead, it relied on
the Leng May Ma decision,230 even though the legislative history
clearly indicated an intent to conform the section to the provisions of
the Protocol.231 The Court then used this interpretation as evidence
that "return" in Article 33 has a meaning narrower than the standard
definition.
The validity of the Court's contention is questionable. The determi-
nation that the word "return" in a multilateral treaty does not really
mean "return" in the standard sense because it was intended to be
consistent with a decision by the United States Supreme Court is an
untenable proposition. By starting with a narrow and somewhat tor-
tured interpretation of "return" in lieu of the Leng May Ma decision,
the Court began its construction on shaky ground. It also violated the
first rule of treaty construction, namely that a treaty be construed ac-
225. Id. at 194.
226. Id. at 173 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
440 (1989)).
227. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (2), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
228. Sale, 509 U.S. at 180.
229. Id. at 173-77; see supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
230. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); see supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
231. Sale, 509 U.S. at 180 n.36.
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cording to its ordinary meaning.2 32 It is unlikely that the drafters of
Article 33 intended the ordinary meaning of the word "return" to con-
form to the meaning articulated in Leng May Ma.
The Court did not rely solely on the holding in the Leng May Ma
decision, of course. It buttressed its assertion that "return" has a legal
meaning narrower than its ordinary meaning by emphasizing the par-
enthetical inclusion of the French word "refouler. '233 The Court's ar-
gument was an intricate and somewhat confusing one. It was troubled
by the fact that neither of two respected English-French dictionaries
include "refouler" as one of the definitions of "return. ' 234 Moreover,
it noted that the dictionaries' English translations of "refouler" do not
include the word "return. '235 The Court then listed some of the other
definitions of "refouler," such as "repulse," "repel," "drive back," and
"expel. '236 Using these definitions, the Court determined that "re-
turn" actually means "to 'repulse' rather than to 'reinstate.' 237
Nevertheless, even these definitions fail to support the Coast
Guards' actions. Using some of the most common translations of
"refouler," one might have proposed a more plausible version of Arti-
cle 33. Substituting the standard synonyms for "refouler," Article 33
reads: "No contracting state shall expel or [repulse, drive back, or
repel] a refugee in any manner whatsoever. '238 These translations ac-
curately describe what the Coast Guard was doing. In fact, as Justice
Blackmun noted, the French press used the word "refouler" to de-
scribe the interdiction program.239 The majority, however, deter-
mined that "[t]o the extent that they are relevant, these translations
imply that 'return' means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at
a border rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular
destination. '240 Of course, the text of Article 33-to the extent that it
is relevant anyway-speaks of no such "border" or threshold that
would activate the obligation of non-refoulement.
232. See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (noting that
when treaty "interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordina-
rily strong contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation."); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention];
RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 325(1).
233. Sale, 509 U.S. at 180-82.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 181.
237. Id. at 182.
238. Id. at 192 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. Sale, 509 U.S. at 192.
240. Id. at 181-82.
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Finally, the majority rested its analysis on some comments included
in the negotiating history of the Convention, specifically those made
by the Dutch delegate. 24' The delegate expressed concern over the
scope of Article 33, and requested that his view that mass migrations
across borders were not protected by the Convention be placed in the
record. 242 It was recorded without objection.243 The Court deter-
mined that the comments made by the Dutch delegate demonstrated a
consensus among the contracting parties.244
Here, too, the rules of construction employed by the Court were
flawed. The first principle, already discussed above, provides that a
treaty provision be construed consistent with its ordinary meaning.245
As such, the negotiations behind the treaty cannot supercede its lan-
guage. Reliance on a treaty's travaux preparatoires is disfavored in
international law. 246 Reliance is only appropriate where the terms of
the treaty are "manifestly absurd or unreasonable. '247 By emphasiz-
ing the negotiating history, the Court elevated it above the plain lan-
guage of Article 33.
Even accepting the Court's method of treaty construction, its con-
clusion that the Dutch delegate's concerns represented a consensus
because no party objected to the comment's entry into the record is
not convincing. Failing to object to the documentation of a minority
viewpoint does not imply one's acceptance of that view. The Court
used the few comments248 that arguably could be interpreted as ex-
pressing a desire to limit the scope of Article 33 as proof that it did not
apply extraterritorially. 249 In doing so, the Court elevated the negoti-
ating history above the language of the provision itself. Instead, the
241. See id. at 184-87 (relying on the comments of Baron van Boetzelaer the delegate from the
Netherlands).
242. Id. at 185-86.
243. Id. at 186.
244. Id. at 186-87.
245. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at 229.
246. Sale, 509 U.S. at 195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(relying on Vienna Convention, supra
note 232, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340).
247. Vienna Convention, supra note 232, art. 32 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340; Sale, 509 U.S. at 195
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[E]ven the general rule of treaty construction allowing limited resort to travaux
preparatoires "has no application to oral statements made by those engaged in negoti-
ating the treaty which were not embodied in any writing and were not communicated to
the government of the negotiator or to its ratifying body....
Id. (quoting Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 360 (1934)).
248. The court erroneously relied upon the unofficial comments of a few countries to assert
that Article 33 was meant to have extraterritorial effect. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 184-87 (relying on
the concerns expressed by the Dutch, Swiss and English delegates).
249. It is important to note that the United States was among the countries that did not ob-
ject. Sale, 509 U.S. at 195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Court should have interpreted Article 33 according to the ordinary
meaning of its terms. The plain language of the treaty prohibits forced
repatriation in any manner whatsoever.250
3. The Interdiction Program and the Object and Purpose of the
Protocol
At the outset of Sale, the Court noted that "[t]he wisdom of the
policy choices made by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton is not a
matter for our consideration."'251 Surely the majority did not believe
that laws exist in a vacuum, affecting no one and leaving no room for
policy considerations. In fact, had the Court adhered to more tradi-
tional rules of treaty construction, it likely would have considered the
interdiction program's impact on the Haitians a necessary step in de-
termining the extraterritorial applicability of Article 33.
Though international rules of treaty construction differ from those
used in United States courts, both methods have significant similari-
ties. Both the international and American approaches ultimately en-
deavor to ascertain the meaning intended by the parties.252 Under
traditional rules of construction, the ordinary meaning of the terms of
the agreement is the starting point for such a determination.2 53 The
terms are to be considered in light of the object and purpose of the
treaty.254 Although American courts are more willing than interna-
tional bodies, such as the Commission, to resort to the negotiating
history of an agreement in determining its object and purpose,255 both
ultimately examine the action at issue within the object and purpose
of the agreement. As explained at length above, the Court miscon-
strued the ordinary meaning of the text of Article 33. Even if one
concedes that the language is ambiguous, however, the history of the
interdiction program illustrates that it was not consistent with Article
33's overriding object and purpose.
250. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
251. Sale, 509 U.S. at 165.
252. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 325 n.4 ("On the other hand, both the Vienna Con-
vention and the United States approach seek to determine the intention of the parties.").
253. Id.
254. Id. § 325(1) ("An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accord-
ance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.").
255. Id. § 325 n.4.
Moreover, since the "ordinary meaning" of terms is to be determined in context and in
the light of the object and purpose of the agreement, both "context" and "the object
and the purpose" may have to be identified and often cannot be determined without
recourse to the preparatory materials and to other "extraneous" evidence.
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In upholding the interdiction program, the Sale Court summarily
dismissed these policies as irrelevant to its inquiry.2 56 Even passing
contemplation of the Haitian Program and its adverse effects on the
Haitian refugees reveals that the program was not consistent with Ar-
ticle 33 as understood within the context of the object and purpose of
the Protocol. As the Supreme Court has previously stated, "[t]reaties
are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two con-
structions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed
under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be pre-
ferred. '' 25 7 This principle of treaty construction is particularly relevant
to the Protocol, "the overriding purpose of which was to safeguard the
rights of a special, vulnerable group in need of protection. Indeed, the
preamble to the [Protocol] notes that it was adopted in order 'to as-
sure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights
and freedoms." 2 58 When read as the Court interpreted it, Article 33
would extend to refugees the fundamental right of non-return and
then extinguish that very right through the extraterritorial loophole. 259
Such an interpretation is hardly consistent with the object and pur-
pose of Article 33, which seeks to prevent the return of refugees to
frontiers where their life or freedom might be threatened.260
4. The Commission's Decision
The flawed method of treaty construction used by the Court
throughout its analysis resulted in an interpretation of Article 33 that
ignored the ordinary meaning of its terms within the object and pur-
pose of the treaty. Though it effectively ended litigation over the mat-
ter in United States courts, the Sale decision did not completely halt
the inquiry into the extraterritorial nature of Article 33. After the
Court handed down its opinion, the Commission agreed to hear a sim-
ilar petition brought by many of the same complainants. 261 The Com-
mission ultimately concluded that the interdiction program violated,
among other things, the right to seek and receive asylum guaranteed
by Article XXVII of the American Declaration.262 In reaching this
256. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (refusing to address the policies be-
hind the program).
257. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
258. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae, at 12 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR] (quoting Protocol, supra note 50, preamble 19 U.S.T.
at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267).
259. Id. at 12-13.
260. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
261. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550, OEA/ser. L./V./11.84, doc. 51 (1997).
262. Id.
[Vol. 48:559
RACE AND FOREIGN POLICY
conclusion, however, the Commission necessarily considered the ex-
traterritorial applicability of Article 33. In order to more thoroughly
consider the international obligations entailed by Article 33, the Com-
mission felt it was necessary to examine the impact of the interdiction
program on the returned Haitians within the context of the object and
purpose of the Protocol-a much broader inquiry than that of the
Supreme Court.
Article XXVII provides that "[e]very person has the right, in case
of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asy-
lum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each country
and with international agreements. '263 The Article sets forth two cri-
teria, both of which must be satisfied in order for the right to seek
asylum to exist. First, the right must be consistent with the laws of the
country in which asylum is sought. 264 Second, the right must be in
accordance with international agreements. 265
The Commission addressed the second criterion first, pointing out
that the Protocol was the international agreement relevant to the
analysis. 266 It explained that the Protocol established the criteria for
being a "refugee. ' '267 The Commission held that international law rec-
ognizes the right of a person seeking refuge to a hearing to determine
his or her status as a refugee.268 It cited the obligation of non-refoule-
ment provided by Article 33 as evidence of the right of Haitians to
seek asylum free from interference. 269 Contrary to the Supreme
Court's view, the Commission concurred with "the view advanced by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in its Amicus
Curiae brief in its argument before the Supreme Court, that Article 33
had no geographical limitations. '270
The Commission then examined the first criterion of Article
XXVII. According to the Commission, the fact that the United States
violated the duty of non-refoulement does not mean that it violated
Article XXVII of the American Declaration.271 The right to seek and
receive asylum must also be consistent with the laws of the United
States. The American government argued that the Sale decision pro-
vided that Haitians "are not entitled to enter the United States or to
263. American Declaration, supra note 63, art. XXVI.
264. Convention, supra note 47, art. 33 (1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
265. Id.
266. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 599.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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avoid repatriation to Haiti, even if they are refugees under the stan-
dards of the 1951 Convention or the standards of U.S. law."272
In contrast, the Commission noted that the United States recog-
nizes the right of aliens who have arrived at American shores to
"seek" asylum under United States law, though there is no mandatory
"grant" of asylum.273 Indeed, asylum is only granted to those who
meet the criteria of "refugee" provided in American law. Therefore,
the Commission concluded, United States law recognizes the general
right of aliens to seek asylum without restriction. 274 Additionally, it
explained that, contrary to the assertion by the Sale Court, the United
States has consistently recognized the right of Haitians, even those
intercepted at sea, to seek and receive asylum. 275 It pointed to the
language in Reagan's Executive Order which provided that "no per-
son who is a refugee will be returned without his consent. '276
The practical difference between the right to "seek" asylum and the
"grant" of asylum is also crucial. By interdicting Haitians on the high
seas without the opportunity for hearings to determine refugee status,
the United States deprived the refugees of their right to seek asy-
lum. 277 At this point, American domestic laws do not even come into
play with respect to this right. The right to seek asylum attaches upon
the refugee's departure from the territory where she is persecuted, not
upon her entry into the territory where she seeks asylum.278 Indeed,
the actions taken by the United States outside of its territory violated
the right to seek asylum, a right generally regarded as fundamental.
The interdiction program also prevented Haitians from seeking asy-
lum in other countries, such as Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, or any other
country in the area.2 79 The Coast Guard failed to make any factual
determination with respect to the destination of the Haitians. In fact,
one third of Haitian refugees sought asylum in countries other than
the United States.2 80
The Commission also concluded that the United States denied Hai-
tian refugees equality before the law.281 It cited the long time Ameri-
272. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 600.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 600-01.
276. Id. at 600 n.36 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1981-83)).
277. Bush's Executive Order completely eliminated interviews aboard Coast Guard cutters.
Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1993).
278. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. at 155, 193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 601.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 591.
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can policy that provides for more favorable treatment of refugees
from Communist or enemy countries. 2 2 This discrimination clearly
violates the object and purpose of the Protocol. 28 3 The Protocol es-
tablished rights for refugees, irrespective of their nation of origin.284
B. A History of Haitian-American Relations
Although the Commission's inquiry was much broader than that of
the United States Supreme Court, it still failed to consider the signifi-
cance of the Haitian Program within the context of Haitian-American
relations. Thus, even the Commission's analysis did not address the
racial contingencies of American policies toward Haitian refugees. As
such, it overlooked the extent to which the United States used refugee
law as a tool of foreign policy, something which the Commission ex-
pressly decried in its decision.28 5 This subsection provides a basic his-
tory of Haitian-American relations. Using this history, the analysis
seeks to offer a more complete account of the Haitian Program, an
account which both the Court and the Commission failed to ad-
dress.286 When viewed in light of this history, this analysis reveals that
the Haitian Program involves exactly the kind of policies that the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 sought to eliminate.
1. The "Exploration" of Haiti
The Haitian population has long endured persecution, often in the
form of political violence. Columbus' arrival on the small Caribbean
island in 1492 brought with it the virtual annihilation of the native
inhabitants,287 a familiar practice among "explorers" of the day.288 He
claimed the island for Spain, naming it Hispaniola, and used the native
282. Id.; see infra notes 364-72 and accompanying text.
283. Protocol, supra note 50, preamble, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267; see supra text
accompanying note 258.
284. Protocol, supra note 50, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
285. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 606-07.
286. It is important to point out that, in considering the object and purpose of the Protocol,
the Commission did assess what happened to Haitians returned to Port-au-Prince pursuant to
the interdiction program. Id. Furthermore, the Commission pointed out that the United States
has favored the extraterritorial applicability of Article 33 in other contexts. Id. at 569. It is the
position of this Comment, however, that the Commission's neglect of even broader American
policies, past and present, resulted in an insufficient account of the role of racism and foreign
policy considerations in the Haitian Program, thereby downplaying the extent of American dis-
regard for international law.
287. EMILY GREENE BALCH, OCCUPIED HAITI 2 (1927); see PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF
HAITI 60 (estimating the number of natives at 50,000 in 1510, down from nearly eight million at
the close of the fifteenth century).
288. See, e.g., HOWARD ZN, Columbus, the Indians, and Human Progress, in A PEOPLE'S
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 1-22 (1985).
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population as a no-wage labor pool working to benefit the mother-
land.2 89 After decimating the native population, the Spanish masters
began importing Africans to replenish the dwindling labor supply in
1505.290 The brutality continued without mercy.291
The 1600s marked increased piracy in the Caribbean, and many
French buccaneers settled on the western end of Hispaniola. 92 The
western third of the island, named by the pirates "Saint Domingue,"
was eventually ceded to France in 1697 through the Treaty of Rys-
wick. 293 By the mid-1700s a solid class system had already developed,
with three main groups populating the island: French (born either in
France or on the colony), mulattos,2 94 and African slaves (by far the
majority of the population).2 95 Ownership of the territory mattered
little; the French rulers were as brutal as their Spanish predecessors.
Inspired by the French Revolution and, to a much lesser extent, the
American war for independence, the African population on St. Dom-
ingue began to stir.296 What followed was a bloody slave-led revolu-
tion that saw the last of Napoleon's forces routed in 1803 and resulted
in independence for the new slave-led nation on January 1, 1804.297
The new state renamed itself Haiti for the island's native Arawak
name.2 98 Haiti was the first free nation in Latin America, and the
second oldest free nation in the western hemisphere, behind only the
United States.299
2. The United States in Haiti
The United States watched with great interest as events unfolded in
Haiti. Of particular concern for the young nation to the north was the
possible example that the war in Haiti provided for its own slave pop-
289. BALCH, supra note 287, at 2.
290. Id.
291. FARMER, supra note 287, at 60-63.
292. BALCH, supra note 287, at 2.
293. Id.
294. Note that "mulatto" is a term currently used in Haiti to denote social status and class as
well as mixed blood. Jean Jean-Pierre, The Tenth Department, in HAITI: DANCEROUS CROSS-
ROADS 195, 197-98 (North American Congress on Latin America ed., 1995).
295. See BALCH, supra note 287, at 2-3 (estimating the population breakdown at 40,000
French persons, 40,000 mixed-blood Haitians born to African or mulatto mothers and white
fathers, and 700,000 African slaves).
296. See id. at 3 (noting that about 800 Haitians, slaves and mulattos, participated in the
American Revolution); see also FARMER, supra note 287, at 66-67 (discussing the impact of the
French Revolution on Haitian slaves).
297. FARMER, supra note 287, at 71.
298. Id. at 60, 71. The Arawak name was "Ayiti." Id.
299. Id. at 71.
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ulation. 300 During the later stages of the Haitian Revolution, the
United States contributed at least $750,000 and some troops to aid the
French effort. 30' The American contribution added to an already sig-
nificant number of foreigners fighting the slaves, including English,
Dutch, Polish, German, and Swiss troops. 302 When the slave colony
finally won its independence, the United States withheld official rec-
ognition of the republic until 1862.303 As Senator Robert Hayne of
South Carolina explained in 1824, "We never can acknowledge her
independence ...[t]he peace and safety of a large portion of our
union forbids us even to discuss [it]. ' '304
Although the United States initially refused official recognition of
Haiti, increased American involvement in Haitian affairs from the
mid-1800s betrayed its interest in the island country. Between 1849
and 1913, American Navy ships entered Haitian waters at least
twenty-four times, purportedly to protect American property and
lives. 305 Perhaps more interesting to the United States than protecting
American lives, however, were the strategic advantages of the M6le
St. Nicolas, a safe harbor across the Winward Passage from Cuba.30 6
Given this persistent presence in and around the island, the American
invasion and subsequent occupation of Haiti in July of 1915 seemed to
surprise few observers:
In retrospect, it was merely surprising that the US had held back so
long from military intervention. Between 1849 and 1915 American
warships had been almost continually present in Haitian waters, os-
tensibly protecting the lives and property of US citizens. Now, with
the final disintegration of Haitian constitutional politics, what had
hitherto been seen as a 'public nuisance' by US governments had
become an unacceptable security risk ... What mattered was the
US perception of Haiti's strategic importance and its view that Eu-
ropean, and particularly German, expansionism in the Caribbean
could not be tolerated.30 7
300. NOAM CHOMSKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST CONTINUES 199 (1993).
301. FARMER, supra note 287, at 68.
302. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 199.
303. Id. at 200. Chomsky argues that the timing of recognition was no coincidence:
With the American Civil War underway, Haiti's liberation of slaves no longer posed a
barrier to recognition; on the contrary, President Lincoln and others saw Haiti as a
place that might absorb blacks induced to leave the United States (Liberia was recog-
nized in the same year, in part for the same reason).
Id.
304. FARMER, supra note 287, at 78-79.
305. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 200.
306. FARMER, supra note 287, at 82-83.
307. JAMES FERGUSON, PAPA Doc, BABY Doc: HAITI AND THE DUVALIERS 23-24 (1987).
Ferguson also describes the use of Haiti for strategic advantages against Germany in World War
I and the increase in American investment in Haiti during the occupation. Id. at 24-25.
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Many commentators portray the occupation as a benign effort to
restore order to Haiti after its president was lynched. 308 Reality con-
tradicts this assertion. More than 3,000 Haitians died fighting the
American occupants from 1918 to 1920.309 Moreover, attitudes
among important members of the United States government demon-
strated little beneficence. President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of
State Robert Lansing bluntly summed up the prevailing view at the
time of the occupation:
The experience of Liberia and Haiti show that the African race are
devoid of any capacity for political organization and lack genius for
government. Unquestionably there is an inherent tendency to re-
vert to savagery and tb cast aside the shackles of civilization, which
are irksome to their physical nature. Of course, there are many ex-
ceptions to this racial weakness, but it is true of the mass, as we
know from experience in this country. It is that which makes the
negro problem practically unsolvable. 310
His opinion was not uncommon.311 Regardless of past or present in-
terpretations of the occupation in American history books, many Hai-
tians viewed the United States presence as yet another chapter in an
ever-lengthening saga of strained relations with the hemispheric
superpower.
The United States continued its occupation through 1930, initially
governing Haiti directly, but later establishing a puppet regime after
308. See Noam Chomsky, Democracy Enhancement 11: The Case of Haiti, Z MAGAZINE, July/
Aug. 1994 (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.2mag.org/chomsky/index.cfm> (disputing some
standard historical accounts of the occupation which assert American beneficence); see also
FARMER, supra note 287, at 95-103 (discussing historical accounts portraying Haitians as resisting
of the occupation).
309. Greg Chamberlain, Up by the Roots: Haitian History through 1987, in HAITI: DANGER-
OUS CROSSROADS, supra note 294, at 14. Chamberlain describes the brutality:
The caco leader Charlemagne P6ralte was shot dead in his camp in October 1919 by a
U.S. Marine disguised as a Black who had been led there by a Haitian mercenary. The
North Americans lashed his half-naked body to a door. The resulting Christ-like image
has been a powerful symbol of Haitian national identity and resistance ever since.
Id.
310. See CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 224 (quoting then Secretary of State Robert Lansing).
311. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan once exclaimed, "Dear me, think of it, Niggers
speaking French." Id. at 201. On a trip to Haiti in 1917, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Franklin Delano Roosevelt recorded in his diary a conversation he had with a traveling compan-
ion who was to become one of the occupation's leading civilian officials. Id. His companion
marveled at the Haitian Minister of Agriculture, commenting that "that man would have
brought $1,500 at auction in New Orleans in 1860 for stud purposes." Id. Colonel Waller from
Virginia described the Haitian elite, stating, "they are real niggers and no mistake - there are
some very fine looking, well educated polished men here, but they are real nigs beneath the
surface." Id. Ferguson indicated that "[tihere is no reason to assume that Waller's view was an
isolated one." FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 27.
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increased Haitian resistance. 312 American control of the island nation
continued in spite of its obvious violation of international law.313
With opposition to the occupation mounting, however, the United
States government realized that the puppet regime would not last.314
The American military began its withdrawal from the island in 1934
with a treaty recognizing full Haitian sovereignty.3 15 The occupation
impacted the subsequent political stability in Haiti in two significant
ways: it greatly weakened the civil society and it entrenched the state
apparatus in the form of the newly created gendarmerie, "an army to
fight the people. '316
These two developments made the climate right for the "election"
of Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier on a black nationalism platform.317
In a 1957 election that was riddled with fraud, Papa Doc secured the
presidency, thus inaugurating another tempestuous chapter in Haitian
history.318 Papa Doc proved especially adept at the art of brutal pop-
ulation control, and with the aid of the newly organized Tontons
Macoutes,319 he terrorized the poor masses more vigorously than any
previous Haitian leader.320
Although Papa Doc's despotic tendencies were well-known in the
United States, American support for the dictator was substantial. For
example, the Kennedy administration agreed to increase monetary aid
to Haiti, much of which provided Papa Doc's vast wealth, in exchange
for the nation's crucial vote to keep Cuba out of the Organization of
312. FARMER, supra note 287, at 93.
313. For a brief analysis of the occupation's illegality, see BALCH, supra note 287, at 163-65
app. A. Among the "generous" acts of the occupying forces, Balch explains, are the seizure of
Haitian national funds, the imposition and enforcement of martial law, and the establishment of
a puppet government, "chosen in 1915, [and] unsupported by any elected representatives since
1917," all illegal by the prevailing norms of international law. Id.
314. See FARMER, supra note 287, at 90-103 (discussing Haitian resistance to the occupation).
315. FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 27-28.
316. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti's Nightmare and the Lessons of History, in HArri: DAN-
GEROUS CROSSROADS, supra note 294, at 121, 127.
317. The first two Haitian regimes after the American withdrawal proved nothing more than
light-skinned puppets of the United States. See FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 30-37. The still
powerful resentment of the occupation ultimately doomed these regimes and made the black
nationalist movement popular. Id. Papa Doc took advantage of this popular sentiment, articu-
lating a platform that framed Haiti's troubles as a function of race (the mulatto elite versus the
black masses), not class. See id. (describing Papa Doc's rise to the presidency).
318. See FARMER, supra note 287, at 107 (explaining some of the election's "anomalies," such
as the 7,500 ballots returned from small island with only 900 registered voters).
319. Duvalier created his own personal security force, the Volunteers for National Security
("VSN"). Id. at 107. The VSN was dubbed Tontons Macoutes, mythical "bogeymen with sacks,"
into which children were stuffed. Id. at 108.
320. See id. at 107-08 (discussing the formation of the Tontons Macoutes and their initial reign
of terror); see also FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 40-41 (discussing the formation and functions
of the Tontons Macoutes).
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American States ("OAS").321 The United States primarily justified
the support as necessary to "contain the spread of communism" in the
region.322 One commentator noted,
The US dilemma was obvious: to support an unsavory regime which
would remain anti-communist if paid to do so, or to withdraw aid
and run the risk of 'losing' another formerly dependable fiefdom.
The dilemma became all the more acute when Duvalier finally
abandoned all pretence of democratic rule.3 23
When Papa Doc became ill in 1970 his control of the country de-
clined noticeably. 324 Papa Doc, however, quickly dashed any hope
among the Haitian citizenry of escaping another dictatorship when he
appointed his son Jean-Claude to the presidency. 325 The minimum
age for the presidency was accordingly lowered from forty to eighteen,
and "Baby Doc" took control of Haiti as its "president for life" the
day his father died in April of 1971.326
Baby Doc's reign of terror was tyrannical at best, and it rolled along
with the tacit approval, and surreptitious support, of the United
States. 327 Thousands of Haitians attempted to escape Baby Doc's
wrath, taking to the seas in rafts in an attempt to make it to foreign
shores. 328 The American government, for its part, continued to sup-
321. The money supplied by the United States built the international airport in Port-au-
Prince, among other things (such as lining the pockets of Papa Doc and his entourage). FERGU-
SON, supra note 307, at 44.
322. See id. at 43 (describing America's concern over Papa Doc's apparent ambivalence to-
wards communism, a fear that he often used to blackmail the United States for more financial
support); see also FARMER, supra note 287, at 109 (outlining the American policy objectives
regarding Haiti).
323. FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 43.
324. Id. at 55.
325. Id. at 56. Papa Doc made special constitutional arrangements in order to appoint his son.
Id.
326. Id.
327. FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 57.
U.S. warships were standing by between Haiti and Miami, preventing the return of any
exiles who might find the moment appropriate for an uprising. On the Dominican bor-
der, too, troops and tanks were prepared to stop unusual movements into Haiti. True
to their word, the U.S. administration and its Dominican ally, Balaguer, were deter-
mined to ensure the uneventful and uncomplicated succession of Jean-Claude Duvalier.
Id.
328. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 206. Ferguson sums up the Duvaliers' rule as:
[T]he social and economic ruin of Haiti. Between 30,000 and.60,000 people were killed
by state terrorism during this period, and many others were exiled and otherwise bru-
talized. The country had become the poorest in the western hemisphere ... Aid, the
mainstay of the economy under Duvalier, had been squandered and pilfered at the
approximate rate of 80 per cent ... Papa Doc was relieving the treasury of some $10
million per year. The US government and other national and international agencies
had thus paid dearly to preserve "stability" in Haiti, as had the Haitian people for
Washington's toleration of their dictator.
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port the dictatorship despite its full knowledge of the extent of its cor-
ruption and violence. 32 9 Baby Doc failed to inspire the same fear as
his father in the Haitian population. Consequently, his overthrow be-
came imminent. 330 Rather than face the angry masses, he and his fam-
ily fled to France in February of 1986,331 taking with them much of the
wealth that they had accumulated at the expense of the Haitian
population.
After Baby Doc's departure, Haiti's political situation saw more
bloodshed and chaos, at one point having three national leaders in as
many months.332 In 1990 the United Nations-monitored elections in
Haiti provided the first democratically elected leader in the country's
history.333 Jean-Bertrand Aristide garnered nearly 67% of the vote in
an election with a 70% voter participation rate.334 Significantly, the
closest candidate was Marc Bazin, the choice of the American govern-
ment, with only 14% of the vote. 335
As a Catholic priest and an adherent to liberation theology, Aris-
tide gained popularity among poor Haitians with anti-capitalism and
anti-American rhetoric.336 During the first few months of his tenure,
Haiti saw a sharp decline in human rights violations and extrajudicial
killings, something that should have won him at least a little support
from the American government.337 Aristide's reforms also endeav-
FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 57-58.
329. Frontline: Showdown in Haiti (PBS television broadcast, June 14, 1994). The U.S. State
Department referred lovingly to Baby Doc and his entourage as "the morally repugnant elite."
Id.
330. See FARMER, supra note 287, at 115-25 (discussing the popular opposition to Baby Doc,
led in part by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, during the last year of his reign); see also Chamberlain,
supra note 309, at 16-18 (discussing the origins of resistance to Baby Doc).
331. FERGUSON, supra note 307, at 119. An unmarked American transport plane from the
United States base at Guantanamo in Cuba flew Baby Doc to safety. Id.
332. Id. at 146.
333. See, e.g., id.
334. INS RESOURCE INFORMATION CTR., PRIHTI/93.00, PROFILE SERIES HAITI 11 (Aug.
1993).
335. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 209.
336. See JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE, IN THE PARISH OF THE POOR (1990). Aristide fre-
quently used the pulpit to preach against American involvement in Haiti: "The great contrast
between the U.S. and Haiti is not because-theologically speaking-God has abandoned us and
looks after the U.S., but because our wealth has been, is, and will be stolen by the U.S. It's clear
that God has not abandoned us." Frontline, supra note 329.
337. Of course, no such support was forthcoming. See FARMER, supra note 287, at 161-71
(noting the reforms under Aristide). Human rights abuses decreased by 75% under Aristide.
See CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 210-12 (citing several human rights reports). Not surprisingly,
Aristide's presidency marked the first time since the fall of Baby Doc that the United States
concerned itself with human rights abuses in Haiti. Id. The American government hurriedly
compiled records of alleged human rights violations committed under Aristide in an attempt to
undermine popular support for him in the United States and abroad. Id. at 210-11. No prior
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ored to root out government corruption, an especially formidable task
in Haiti. 338 The mass migration that began in the late 1970s and early
1980s slowed to nothing more than a trickle,339 and many Haitians
living legally in the United States returned to their homeland.340
The hiatus from the violence lasted only a few months for the Hai-
tian people. The military,341 led by General Raoul Cedras, overthrew
Aristide in September of 1991.342 The resulting terror proved familiar
to the Haitian population, over 1,000 citizens of which were killed in
the months after the coup. 343 The renewed attack on the citizenry
resulted in yet another mass migration. Once again, Haitians tried to
escape the junta-sponsored violence via the seas.
3. Summary: Analyzing American Involvement in Haiti
The role of the United States in Haitian history is often viewed in
either of two ways. The domination of Haiti can be seen as motivated
by American strategic concerns. Given the American government's
fairly recent obsession with communism, 344 this approach is the most
attractive and natural choice. As the brief history above indicates,
strategic concerns often dominated Haitian-American affairs.345 An-
other perspective, however, provides that the treatment of Haiti is a
function of race. The blatant racism that permeated Haitian occupa-
tion effectively demonstrates the significance of race in the American-
Haitian relationship. 346 Perhaps, however, the best way of looking at
American-Haitian relations requires both perspectives as inextricably
intertwined.
administration had compiled such records during the Duvalier years. Id. The mainstream
American press echoed Washington's concerns about Aristide's dedication to democracy, reality
notwithstanding. Id.
338. FARMER, supra note 287, at 163-71.
339. Id. at 169.
340. Id. at 167.
341. The military as it presently exists was organized by the United States during the occupa-
tion to act as a domestic police force. See Trouillot, supra note 316, at 127,
342. See FARMER, supra note 287, at 180-83 (describing the coup).
343. Compare HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 119 (1993) (estimating that well over
1,000 people had been executed in the months after the coup) with FARMER, supra note 287, at
183 (quoting Bishop Willy Romdlus' estimate that 1,500 people were killed in the first few days
after the coup). The Commission also reported in 1993 that 1,500 Haitians had been killed by
state-sponsored violence, House Subcomm., supra note 111, at 8, though many observers argued
that this number is a conservative estimate. See Murray Kempton, Haiti Blockade Works Two
Ways, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1993, at 31.
344. This is the author's opinion.
345. See supra notes 300-23 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48:559
RACE AND FOREIGN POLICY
The United States became involved in Haitian affairs for strategic
purposes. Its efforts in support of the French during Haiti's war for
independence 347 sought to protect its substantial investments in the
colony.348 Primarily out of fear over the example the slave nation
might set for American slaves, 349 the United States government with-
held recognition of the new republic for almost sixty years. It finally
recognized Haiti in the midst its own civil war, at least in part to use
the nation as a dumping ground for its now "free" slave population. 350
Since the mid-nineteenth century, American warships frequently
patrolled Haitian waters,351 primarily to stem the tide of European
expansionism. The occupation served much the same purpose.352
Post-World War II involvement in Haitian affairs, typically through
either puppet regimes or friendly dictators,353 was mostly justified as
necessary to contain communism,354 an "obvious" national security
issue.
Foreign policy, by definition, involves strategic considerations. Ex-
plaining away the domination of Haitian politics as motivated only by
such concerns, however, sterilizes the nature of American involve-
ment. Given the prevailing attitudes of United States officials during
the occupation, one must conclude that racism has always guided the
implementation of United States foreign policy in Haiti. Though ad-
missions of racist tendencies on the part of American policy wonks are
much harder to come by in recent times, inferences can reasonably be
made when contemplating advice such as Kennan's. 355
At the short end of Kennan's "position of disparity" are the devel-
oping nations, predominately nations of color. "Vague" and "unreal"
objectives such as human rights, of course, offer at' least bare protec-
tions to those nations that have been drained by their colonizers. 356
But to support a system that protects these rights would eliminate the
"disparity" that so benefits countries such as the United States. The
dominant nation must therefore eschew such policies and manipulate
347. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
348. See FARMER, supra note 287, at 68 (noting that, by the time of the French Revolution,
500 ships sailed to St. Domingue ports each year - a "booming business").
349. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 305-16 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 305-16 and accompanying text.
353. The dictators were friendly to American interests, though by no means friendly in the
traditional sense.
354. See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
355. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 318.
356. Id.
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to the greatest extent possible the domestic politics of developing
nations.
History seems to demonstrate that, the more spite the American
government has for the population that it is exploiting, the greater its
level of involvement.357 The "otherness" of "foreign" populations as
perceived by American officials makes them ripe for conquest. The
United States has frequently interfered in the affairs of our "little
brown brothers" throughout the hemisphere, 358 but none as much as
the Haitian population.359 Indeed, the "Niggers" might speak
French,360 but the entire race clearly "lack[s] genius for govern-
ment, ' 361 and thus deserve no voice in their own affairs. Such is the
vile maxim of the masters-not applicable in American relations with,
say, France.
C. Comparing Refugee Groups
American manipulation of Haitian domestic affairs through its sup-
port of the Duvalier regimes and other unsavory dictators eventually
forced Haitian citizens to flee to foreign shores.362 The Haitian Pro-
gram was adopted to deal with the deluge of refugees. 363 In contrast,
other substantial refugee movements did not elicit similar programs
from American policy makers. One might contend that the "special
treatment" prescribed by the Haitian Program reflected typical Amer-
ican hypocrisy. After all, the United States was denying relief to the
victims of the very conditions that it was responsible for creating.
When viewed within the context of the foregoing history, however, the
357. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (documenting the sources of legal justifica-
tion for conquest of normatively divergent peoples in the western hemisphere). Although Wil-
liams' history sought to reveal the legal foundations of the United States' conquest and
continued subordination of American Indians, his sweeping account of the "discourse of con-
quest" applies equally to American subordination of other populations. Id. Although Williams
argues that the discourses of conquest are based less on pigmentation of "foreign" populations
than on their normative divergence, he presumably understands pigmentation as one form of
normative divergence. Id. at 149 n.116.
358. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, TURNING THE TIDE: U.S. INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE (1985) (documenting U.S. involvement in the politics
of Central American nations).
359. Haiti is one of the only and longest occupations by the United States in this hemisphere.
FARMER, supra note 287, at 47.
360. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 201; see supra note 311 and accompanying text (quoting
then Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1917).
361. CHOMSKV, supra note 300, at 201; see supra note 310 and accompanying text (quoting
then Secretary of State Robert Lansing on his visit to Haiti between 1918 and 1920).
362. See supra notes 328-43 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 80-96 .and accompanying text.
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Haitian Program fits nicely into a well-established pattern of discrimi-
nation against the people of Haiti.
The extent of discrimination against Haitian refugees is indeed
shocking. As noted earlier, only twenty-eight of 24,600 Haitians were
granted asylum under Reagan's interdiction program from 1981 to
1991.364 Under Bush's order about 18,095 refugees were interdicted in
a six month period, 10,149 of whom were sent back to Port-au-Prince
without any kind of status interview. 365 Most of the remaining Hai-
tians were subsequently deported. 366
While Haitian refugees were summarily excluded from American
shores during the Haitian Program, refugees from the Soviet Union
during roughly the same time period received asylum at a rate of
72.6%.367 Romanian refugees were admitted at a rate of 70.3%,368
while 61.5% of Iranian refugees were granted asylum.369 More aston-
ishing still is the fact that only one week after the Sale decision the
INS granted automatic eligibility for permanent United States resi-
dency to 80,000 Chinese dissidents who fled to the United States after
the Tianamen Square massacre. 370
The disparity between Haitians and other classes of refugees is most
striking in the case of Cuba. Between 1966 and 1980, the United
States accepted over 800,000 Cuban nationals.371 Indeed, Cubans
have enjoyed virtual celebrity status in the United States, as evidenced
by the failure of the American government to prosecute forty-eight
Cubans who hijacked an airliner and steered it to Florida. 372 Criminal
acts apparently are not sufficient reason to exclude persons fleeing
from such harsh political situations, unless they are Haitian.
Of course, these refugees fled enemy or communist regimes, and
were thus, according to the American ideology-based policies, polit-
ical refugees.373 It would be absurd to downplay the extent of political
364. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
365. House Subcomm., supra note 111, at 7-8; see text accompanying notes 141-43.
366. House Subcomm., supra note 111, at 8. Of course, these numbers reflect only rough
estimates, due primarily to the fact that the INS database contained "numerous inaccuracies."
Id. Other mistakes riddled the INS's procedures, such as the "numerous" Haitians found to
have credible asylum claims who were "accidentally" sent back to Haiti. Id. at 8-9.
367. Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Repatriation: A Critique of United States'
Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 711 (1993).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Starting Today, U.S. Welcomes 80,000 Chinese, SEATrLE TIMES, July 1, 1993, at Al.
371. Lennox, supra note 367, at 712.
372. U.S. Seeks Legal Ground to Free Group Who Diverted Plane from Cuba, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 31, 1992, at N15. "Diverted" is a euphemism for "hijacked," which is precisely what
the individuals did. Id.
373. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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persecution in these countries at the time. The Haitian population,
however, experienced more than just political persecution. The realis-
tic possibility of murder and torture at the hands of the state
presented itself to almost every poor Haitian with every sunrise.374
The discrimination that drove the Haitian Program reveals another
facet of Washington's prevailing attitudes toward Haiti. The ideology-
based refugee policies reflect a belief that resistance to communist or
enemy regimes was widespread in those particular countries. This be-
lies the seemingly substantial domestic support for certain enemy
leaders, for example the Ayatollah or Soviet leaders. 375 Such leaders'
domestic "popularity" could largely be attributed to strong nationalist
tendencies and anti-American stances. Regardless of the reality of
their domestic support, the American government often looked upon
these favored populations as peoples steeped in the struggle for de-
mocracy, needing only help from lax American refugee policies.
In contrast, none of the Haitian leaders, from Papa Doc until Aris-
tide, enjoyed any kind of popular domestic support. Resistance to
these regimes was frequent and massive and often rewarded with
state-sponsored violence.376 The extent of dissidence in Haiti was
demonstrated by the election of Aristide, 377 an event that grass roots
organization worked on for over a decade.378 Yet Haitians historically
have been treated by the INS as if they lack any political convictions.
The INS assumed that persons fleeing Haiti, having no political con-
cerns, could only be leaving for economic reasons.379 The "Niggers"
might be able to speak French,380 but they still lack "any capacity for
political organization, ' 381 and thus could never be fleeing for political
reasons.
D. Justifying the Haitian Program
The American government and other "impartial" observers posited
several reasons for treating Haitian refugees differently. The first jus-
tification, already discussed above,382 provided that the Haitians'
374. See supra notes 325-41 and accompanying text.
375. Note the strength of post-Soviet communists in Russia. World Report, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
4, 1994, at 4.
376. See supra notes 328-43 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 336-42 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
380. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 201; see supra note 311 and accompanying text (quoting
then Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1917).
381. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 201; see supra note 310 and accompanying text, (quoting
then Secretary of State Robert Lansing on his visit to Haiti between 1918 and 1920).
382. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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flight was prompted by the country's lugubrious economic state. As
such, they were not even "refugees" by any formal legal definition,
383
and thus not entitled to protection. Some other official reasons of-
fered to justify the Haitian Program-all as disingenuous as the eco-
nomic refugee rationale-attempted to mask its racial contingencies.
1. Some Official Justifications
The American government successfully avoided its legal responsi-
bilities to the Haitians by asserting that the obligation of non-refoule-
ment did not extend to refugees on the high seas because they were in
no territory at all.384 But contrary to the government's position in the
Sale case, the argument accepted by the Court, the United States un-
questionably has understood Article 33 to prohibit the forced repatri-
ation of refugees. Reagan's original interdiction program provided
that "no person who is a refugee will be returned without his con-
sent.''385 The agreement between the United States and Haiti was
bound by "international obligations mandated in the Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees. '386
Similarly, in response to an agreement among Britain, Hong Kong,
and Vietnam that provided for the forcible return of Vietnamese refu-
gees, a State Department spokeswoman stated that "[w]e oppose
forced or mandatory repatriation. '38 7 As demonstrated by this state-
ment, the United States has always opposed forced repatriation of ref-
ugees; with the exclusion of Haitians, of course. 388 In voicing its
opposition, the United States previously has indicated its understand-
ing that the obligation of non-refoulement focused on the persecution
to which a refugee might be subjected in the territory to which she is
returned, not the refugee's location at the time of interdiction. In
other words, the availability of the most fundamental protection af-
forded a refugee turns on the refugee's need for protection, not on the
refugee's location when she needs that protection. Essentially, the
383. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
385. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1993); see supra text accompany-
ing note 109.
386. UNHCR, supra note 258, at 14.
387. U.S. Opposes Forcible Return of Boat People, ORANGE CourTY REG., Oct. 30, 1991, at
A17.
388. Des milliers d'Haitens manifestent a Miami en soutien au president Aristide, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-english File; Angela Lau,
Asians Here Troubled By Threat to Refugees, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 4,1991 at B1. "The
refugees' pleas have been heard by the U.S. government, which is 'talking to both British gov-
ernment and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees,' said State Department
spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler. 'Our position on repatriation is well known'." Id.
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Court's decision in Sale eviscerated the express purpose of the INA
and the Protocol by allowing the United States government to shirk its
legal obligations on the basis of a questionable interpretation of Arti-
cle 33.389
Others might justify the Court's decision in Sale by pointing out that
refugee matters properly fall within plenary power doctrine, and thus
were properly subject to judicial deference. As such, issues concern-
ing asylum claims can be checked only through congressional
legislation:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sover-
eignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part
of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right
to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government,
the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one .... If there be any just ground of
complaint ... it must be made to the political department of our
government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.390
Congress sought to check this power, of course, through the Refu-
gee Act of 1980.391 Its express purpose was to end the Executive's use
of asylum as a foreign policy tool aimed at solidifying opposition to
communist regimes. 392 Congress properly reigned in Executive
abuses in asylum matters, Executive Orders contrary to the Refugee
Act such as those comprising the Haitian Program do not enjoy judi-
cial deference. 393
The American government further justified the interdiction pro-
gram as a necessary means of deterring Haitians from making the
deadly voyage across the seas to American shores.394 The government
asserted that the Haitian Program actually saved Haitians who would
have otherwise drowned en route to the United States.395 Of course,
most proponents of this argument fail to mention the Haitians that
were drowned as the Coast Guard boarded their vessels for purposes
of repatriation.396 This rationale also fails to account for widespread
Coast Guard abuses.397
389. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights disagreed with the Court. Case
10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550, 559 OEA/ser. L./V./11.84, doc. 51 (1997).
390. Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, 25 UTAH
L. REV. 279, 305 (1991) (quoting Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
391. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980).
392. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 283.
393. Id. at 305-06.
394. Case 10.675, Inter-Am C.H.R. at 567.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 603.
397. FARMER, supra note 287, at 263-96 (recounting Coast Guard abuses at sea and on Guan-
tanamo Bay).
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In addition to dangers presented by Coast Guard interdiction, Hai-
tians returned to Port-au-Prince in accordance with the Haitian Pro-
gram were required to report their names and addresses to the
Haitian soldiers greeting them at the docks.398 Many of these inter-
dicted refugees were later arrested at home, some were beaten in pub-
lic, and others were shot outright.399
The United States contended that the interdiction program saved
Haitian lives.400 Returning Haitians to their homeland, however,
where human rights violations were a part of quotidian life, in fact
subjected many of the interdictees to severe reprisal. 401 Indeed, if a
Haitian was not a legitimate refugee under international law upon her
initial flight from the country, she certainly would have had a reason-
able and particularized fear of persecution upon her return, thus qual-
ifying her as a refugee. Despite the United States government's
assurances otherwise, the Haitian Program violated domestic and in-
ternational legal obligations. Furthermore, the idea that the program
actually saved Haitian lives contradicts reality.
2. More Likely Reasons Behind the Haitian Program
In spite of American assertions to the contrary, the United States
government did not discriminate against Haitian refugees "for their
own good." A closer look at other events occurring contemporane-
ously with the Bush interdiction program helps illuminate the racial
contingencies of the Haitian Program in general.
As an immediate matter, advisors sought to assuage domestic con-
cerns over the overwhelming number of Haitians arriving on Ameri-
can shores. While Reagan saw the Haitians as "a serious national
problem detrimental to the interests of the United States, ' 40 2 others
were less evasive about the real threat that the refugees posed. For-
mer presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan explained, "If we had to
take a million immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and
put them up in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and
would cause less problems for the people of Virginia?" 40 3 Affording
the refugees temporary protection would burden the people of Flor-
398. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 602-03.
399. Id.
400. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 172 (1993).
401. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 601.
402. Sale, 509 U.S. at 160.
403. Patrick Buchanan - In His Own Words, FAIR, Feb. 26, 1996 (quoting This Week With
David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 8, 1991)).
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ida, who, according to Buchanan's logic, would be unable to cope with
the massive increase in their black population.
Still, one might point to the wholesale acceptance of Cuban asylum
claims as evidence that United States asylum policies are not racially
based. After all, Cubans, persons of dubious whiteness, have bene-
fited from relaxed asylum policies far more than any other refugee
group. 4° 4 In contrast, the favored treatment of Cubans can be easily
explained under an interest convergence analysis, which generally
provides that "[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will
be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites. '40 5 Granting Cubans free passage to American shores served
to strengthen the United States government's crusade against commu-
nism, very much in accordance with the express purpose of the ideol-
ogy based asylum policies. 40 6 The only reason to accept these
undesirables is to effectively demonstrate to the American public the
ills of communism, and thus justify a massive military budget and
other forms of corporate welfare. Haitians, unfortunately, lack the
"benefits" of living under communist rule and are therefore properly
subject to exclusion on an unprecedented level.
Even viewing American policies toward Cuban refugees under an
interest convergence analysis, however, does not mean that race has
played no role in Cuban asylum claims. Prior to 1994, many, if not
most, of the Cubans fleeing to the United States were light-skinned,
affluent professionals. 40 7 But when the Cuban economy was on the
verge of collapse in 1994, sending thousands of poor, black Cubans
fleeing to American shores,40 8 the Clinton administration responded
by extending the interdiction program to counteract the flood, thus
ending over three decades of favored treatment of Cuban refugees.40 9
Perhaps if the refugees were lighter-skinned, richer, or more adept at
baseball, then the United States would not have been so quick to deny
404. See supra notes 367-72 and accompanying text.
405. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Di-
lemma, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 20, 22
(1995). As Bell explains, "Racial remedies may instead be the outward manifestations of unspo-
ken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, ad-
vance, or at least not harm societal interests deemed important by middle- and upper-class
whites." Id.
406. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
407. JON LEE ANDERSON, CHE GUEVARA: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE 409 (1997) (pointing out
that the affluent and middle class were the first to flee the Cuban Revolution, forming a well-off
exile colony of sorts in Miami).
408. Linda Robinson et al., Holding Back the Tide: Clinton's Policy Shift Toward Cuban Refu-
gees Finesses a Bigger Problem, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 29, 1994, at 32, 35-36.
409. Id.
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their admittance. As they were, however, their lot fell quickly with
that of the Haitians.
Allowing Haitian refugees to present asylum claims offered little
benefit to the American government, and thus was not a policy pur-
sued in response to the deluge of refugees. Even if accepting the Hai-
tians served the purposes of American policy makers, as did the
acceptance of Cuban refugees, it probably would not have improved
their treatment. Clinton's 1994 Cuban interdiction program demon-
strated that any benefits gained by the admission of poor blacks flee-
ing from enemy regimes are easily outweighed when their numbers
reach significant levels. 410
E. Maintaining the Position of Disparity
Both the Court and the Commission failed to address many of these
issues. When viewing the Haitian Program in conjunction with the
foregoing history, however, one can reasonably infer the probable
American objectives behind the program. A particularly sanguinary
version of power politics was American policymakers' driving force as
they attempted to ensure a submissive Haitian population that would
have no choice but to cater to the whims of United States foreign
policy. These inferences are strengthened by the fact that the refu-
gees' exclusion proved an essential link in a chain of contemporane-
ous events that broke the back of Haiti's nascent democratic
movement. Properly fit into this context, the Haitian Program signi-
fies yet another chapter in the history of exploitation.
The first factor contributing to the demise of Aristide's popular
movement 411 was the complete failure of the sanctions imposed on the
de facto government.412 It was clear from the start that the OAS em-
bargo imposed immediately after the coup would be toothless. The
blockade never managed to stop the free flow of contraband, espe-
cially oil, across the porous Haitian-Dominican border.413 Surpris-
ingly, the United States was unable to detect this embargo evasion,
410. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
412. The first such embargo, imposed immediately after the military coup, was initiated by the
OAS. See Chomsky, supra note 308. Another embargo was subsequently imposed by the
United Nations. Kim Ives, The Unmaking of a President, in HAm: DANGEROUS CROSSROADS,
supra note 294, at 65, 80.
413. Deidre McFadyen et al., Introduction to HAITI: DANGEROUS CROSSROADS, supra note
294, at 1, 4-6.
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probably because it had busied its forces with stopping the flow of
Haitian refugees. 414
Enforcement became even less likely in February of 1992, as the
Bush administration announced that it would lift the embargo for as-
sembly plants doing business for American companies. 415 This "ex-
emption" was continued under the Clinton administration, as trade
increased by 50%.416 These facilities were "exempted" because "the
Bush and Clinton administrations believed these [U.S.-owned] compa-
nies were so vital to Haiti that they allowed them to continue operat-
ing during the embargo. '417 Of course, this shift mostly benefited
Haiti's business elite who continued to profit from the import/export
business generated by the "exemption. '418 In turn, the elite, who ini-
tially financed Aristide's overthrow, helped sustain the vitality of the
putschists. 419
As the embargo continued in 1993, American trade with Haiti in-
creased by more than half.420 In June of 1993, the United Nations
Security Council attempted to increase the pressure on the junta
through Resolution 841, a mandatory global embargo on oil and arms
supplies to Haiti.421 The new United Nation's embargo did little to
destabilize the regime, however, as contraband continued to flow into
Haiti from the Dominican Republic.4 22
Finally, the United States announced in May of 1994 that it would
tighten the embargo by lifting the exemption for American busi-
nesses.423 The plan also banned all commercial flights and financial
transactions with Haiti.424 The American government, however,
failed to sever the illegal regime's substantial support from the Hai-
tian elite. The ban on financial transactions with Haiti did not include
the assets of the business elite. Thus, the elite were allowed to safely
transfer their money out of American accounts and into other foreign
414. Noam Chomsky, Democracy Restored, Z MAGAZINE, Nov. 1994 (visited Jan. 25, 1999)
<http:/www.zmag.org/chomsky/index.cfm>.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. (quoting from the Christian Science Monitor). Chomsky wondered, "While the vision
of our benevolence brings tears to the eyes, nevertheless duller minds might wonder why only
U.S.-owned enterprises have the curious property of being so beneficial to the suffering people
of Haiti." Id.
418. Paul Farmer, The Significance of Haiti, in HAITI: DANGEROUS CROSSROADS, supra note
294, at 205, 221.
419. Id. at 222.
420. Chomsky, supra note 414.
421. Ives, supra note 412, at 80.
422. Id.
423. Chomsky, supra note 414 and accompanying text.
424, Id.
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banks where it could be used to sustain the junta.425 Additionally,
although the United States paid lip service to the enforcement of the
oil embargo, American oil companies regularly subverted it under
Washington's blind eye.426 By the time the American government fi-
nally reprimanded the American companies, the Haitian elite had al-
ready stockpiled their oil depots for use by the military.427 Thus, the
coup regime remained steadfast, constantly looking to thrash any
peasant that dared raise her head.
The sanctions, however, were not completely ineffective. One Hai-
tian observed that "the people the embargo was supposed to help are
being hurt. They have to pay for things with a 300% increase. They
aren't really hurting any of the big guys. The big guys in the country
are making more money than ever for the past two years. ' 428 While
the Haitian poor and middle class lived under the embargo without
electricity and oil products, the elite and the military regime enjoyed
all of the usual amenities. 429 "There was, in effect, no embargo against
the coup supporters - at the same time the long standing embargo
against the Haitian poor was strengthened, '430 one commentator ob-
served. Indeed, the embargoes crushed the poor, while simultane-
ously solidifying the junta's control over the country.
A second series of events that contributed to the subversion of the
Haitian popular movement involved the negotiations over Aristide's
return to power. Immediately after the coup, the OAS convened a
rare emergency session in order to condemn the action and plan a
course for Aristide's return, resolutions that were explicitly supported
by the United States.431
During the following months, an OAS delegation worked with the
coup leaders while the elected president remained in exile.432 It was
clear from the start of the process, however, that OAS and American
diplomats would require significant concessions by Aristide. The first
proposed agreement, for example, would have lifted the embargo in
exchange for more negotiations, although it mentioned nothing about
restoring Aristide.433 Not surprisingly, Aristide rejected the proposal
425. Id.
426. Farmer, supra note 418, at 221.
427. Id.
428. Frontline, supra note 329.
429. Farmer, supra note 418, at 221.
430. Id. at 223.
431. Ives, supra note 412, at 65.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 71.
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and was quickly labeled "intransigent" by coup parliamentarians and
American officials for refusing to be "flexible. '434
Aristide learned the lesson quickly; if he was to regain his seat as
president, he would have to play along with the very people responsi-
ble for his overthrow. His first concession in the negotiation process
was his popular prime minister, Ren6 Pr6val.435 Aristide was pres-
sured by American ambassador Alvin Adams and OAS special envoy
Augusto Ocampo to replace Pr6val with either Marc Bazin or Ren6
Th6odore, both choices of the junta.436 When Aristide refused, the
American press once again lambasted him for being "intransigent. '437
He eventually acceded to the demands and named Th6odore as
Pr6val's replacement.438 Th6odore was removed by the military
shortly thereafter.439
The first major agreement to come out of the negotiations was the
"Protocol of Accord," signed in Washington in February 1992.440 The
agreement provided for:
1) an amnesty for the army and other authors of the coup; 2) respect
of parliamentary legislation ratified after the coup, which included
Cddras' appointment as head of the army through 1994; and 3) the
lifting of the embargo 'immediately after the ratification of the
prime minister and the inauguration of the government of national
consensus.'
441
Significantly, there was no specific date set for Aristide's return.442
Aristide later backed out of the agreement, asserting that he did not
agree to amnesty for C6dras since "common criminals" were excluded
from the amnesty.443 Once again, the American press disparaged
him.4 4
After the failure of the Washington Protocol, the junta attempted to
win the approval of the international community by naming a new
prime minister to head the reorganized civilian government.445 The
junta appointed Marc Bazin, an obvious attempt to win approval from
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. Note that Bazin was the American-supported opponent of Aristide in the 1990 elec-
tions. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
437. Ives, supra note 412, at 71.
438. Id. at 72.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 74.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Ives, supra note 412, at 74.
444. Id. at 74-75.
445. Id. at 75.
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the United States government.446 With this appointment, the junta
had successfully consolidated its rule, and Aristide was forced to nego-
tiate directly with Bazin. 447
As the negotiations continued, the American government circulated
a pamphlet documenting human rights abuses under Aristide's brief
tenure, although none of the reports alleged state-sponsored vio-
lence. 448 The CIA reported the contents of Aristide's medicine cabi-
net as proof of his mental instability.449 The press echoed disgust over
the exiled president's perceived ungratefulness, and members of Con-
gress began shifting on their support for Aristide's reinstatement. 450
The tepid American support for the democratically elected govern-
ment of Haiti left Aristide with little bargaining power as he entered
into a new set of negotiations in June 1993.45 1 It was appropriate that,
as the Coast Guard was returning refugees to Haiti, the negotiations
took place on Governor's Island, New York, a Coast Guard base.452
The final agreement set the schedule for Aristide's return:
Aristide would name a new prime minister, the UN would lift sanc-
tions, the parliament would undertake a series of reforms of the po-
lice and Armed Forces under the supervision of a UN force,
Aristide would decree a blanket amnesty for those involved in the
coup and then C~dras would voluntarily retire at some point before
Aristide's return, which was set for October 30, 1993. 453
The United Nations/United States-brokered Accord was a disaster
for the Haitian people. The newly appointed prime minister provided
the junta with the legitimacy of the Aristide government, while the
end of the embargo allowed it to further consolidate its grip on the
country. As the negotiations were closing, the coup leaders in Haiti
renewed their attack on the peasant movement.454 It should have sur-
prised few observers when the October 30 restoration date came and
went with no hint that the military planned to relinquish control.455
Although the United States initially appeared adamant about Aris-
tide's return, American negotiators dragged their feet throughout the
negotiations. Officials at Governor's Island continued to make diffi-
cult demands, knowing well that Aristide would not accede to many of
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
449. Frontline, supra note 329.
450. See, e.g., Ives, supra note 412.
451. Id. at 80.
452. Frontline, supra note 329.
453. Ives, supra note 412, at 81.
454. Chomsky, supra note 414.
455. Id.
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
their stipulations.456 When Aristide repeatedly refused to accept an
amnesty clause for the coup leaders, American negotiators such as
Lawrence Pezzullo accused him of being "obstructionist," apparently
confounded by Aristide's reluctance to let murderers go with impu-
nity.457 It is interesting to note that Aristide was labeled "intransi-
gent" throughout the negotiation process for his refusal to negotiate
with an illegal regime, one composed of bona fide terrorists.458 Fur-
thermore, when the restoration date passed with no change of power,
the American government showed little in the way of response, assert-
ing that democracy in Haiti was not worth one American life.459 The
message to the poor Haitian masses was clear: there would be no help
from the United States.
Aristide did not return as president of Haiti until early 1995.460
American delay tactics had worked to perfection, as the democrati-
cally elected president was nearing the end of his five-year constitu-
tional term having actually served only twenty months.461 He was
barred from running again.462 The lengthy negotiations served to le-
gitimize the junta and extend their stay in power. Additionally, the
sieve-like embargo further strengthened the military's grip on Haiti's
poor. The final piece of the puzzle, the Haitian Program, effectively
broke any resistance to the illegal regime, and life for the Haitian poor
continued in tragedy ... as usual.
Aristide once said, "I cannot accept that Haiti should be whatever
the United States wants it to be. ' 463 This attitude obviated the need
for his prompt removal. The Haitian military, in the familiar position
of doing American bidding, did not let American officials down.
While the junta was consolidating its strength during the negotiations
and international embargo, the United States made sure that the peo-
ple responsible for Aristide's success, namely the Haitian peasantry,
were sufficiently punished for their mistake. 464 Accordingly, Haitians
fleeing the widespread violence were immediately returned by Coast
Guard cutters. 465
456. Ives, supra note 412, at 81-83.
457. Id. at 82.
458. It is reminiscent, of course, of past American and Israeli refusal to negotiate with the
PLO for much the same reason. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 373 (discussing reasons behind
U.S./Israeli rejectionism). American hypocrisy has seldom reached such depths.
459. Ives, supra note 412, at 85.
460. Farmer, supra note 418, at 224.
461. Chomsky, supra note 308.
462. Id.
463. CHOMSKY, supra note 300, at 209.
464. Id. at 210-11.
465. See supra notes 110-22 & 138-39 and accompanying text.
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The Haitian masses understood the message well. In the 1990 elec-
tions, 70% of the voting population went to the polls to vote for Aris-
tide compared to just 29% turn-out rate in the 1995 elections. 466
Though former Aristide prime minister Ren6 Pr6val succeeded him as
president, the series of neoliberal economic reforms thrust upon Aris-
tide by American negotiators as a part of the restoration agreements
thwarted his popular agenda.467 Aristide's proposed increase in the
minimum wage to $3.20 a day was scrapped, leveling the minimum at
about $2.00 a day.468 American companies assembling clothing in Ha-
iti no doubt breathed a sigh of relief, by 1984 Haiti was the ninth larg-
est assembler of American goods in the world.469 Post-coup Haiti also
proved an excellent market for American goods such as rice, which
currently accounts for over half of the country's consumption. 470 This
in spite of the fact that over 60% of the population attempts to make
its living by growing crops like rice.471 Meanwhile, modest social pro-
grams such as the literacy project initiated under Aristide have been
eliminated in accordance with IMF austerity measures. 472 Indeed, the
Haitian Program worked exceedingly well in reinforcing the tradi-
tional position of disparity, relegating the Haitian population to its
"rightful place" with other nations of color.
Ill. RECONSIDERING REFUGEE LAW:
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL "OBJEcrIvITY"
The Sale decision is perhaps most significant for the things that it
failed to do rather than the law that it created. The most apparent
impact of the Court's decision was the continued vitality of the Hai-
tian Program, this time under the aegis of legality. 473 More impor-
tantly, by ignoring the effects of the Haitian Program and the
historical context in which it took place, the Court narrowed the scope
of its inquiry. In doing so, it passed on the opportunity to at least
draw attention to the long-time discrimination against Haitian refu-
gees, a practice that fits nicely into an overall pattern of abuse and
466. Clara James, Haiti: The Roof ls Leaking, Z MAGAZINE, June 1997, at 36.
467. See supra notes 435-39 and accompanying text.
468. Farmer, supra note 418, at 221.
469. James, supra note 466, at 33-34.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. For additional information on the effects of IMF and World Bank programs in Haiti,
see Farmer, supra note 418, at 226-27. Farmer's essay also describes Haiti's status after Aris-
tide's return. Id.
473. President Clinton eventually ended the interdiction aspect of the Haitian Program after
being pressured by Randall Robinson's hunger strike. Colman McCarthy, Classic 27-day Hunger
Strike Convinces Clinton, NAT'L CATH. REP., May 27, 1994, at 10.
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subordination of the Caribbean nation at the hands of the United
States. The Court eschewed "vague" and "unreal" objectives such as
human rights, 474 favoring instead the political expediency of the Hai-
tian Program.
Although the Court's analysis fails on its own terms, it is likely a
more favorable disposition for the Haitians would still lack sufficient
scope to reveal the extent of American violations of international law.
In an attempt to give an "objective" hearing to the legal issues in-
volved in Sale, the Court ignored things such as historical context and
the impact of the of the interdiction program on Haitian refugees, fo-
cusing instead on merely "legal" questions. As already outlined
above, however, in order to fully consider America's international ob-
ligations within the object and purpose of the Protocol, the Court
should have found it necessary to address precisely these broader
issues.
Additionally, it is nearly impossible to give a completely objective
hearing of a legal issue that has such profound implications for United
States foreign policy. Indeed, the Court's decision reflected an institu-
tional "agenda" very much in accordance with its function as a branch
of the government. Laws and treaty provisions are often vague
(although probably not in this case), and it is the judiciary's job to
interpret them. In trying to do so, judges
have to draw on their understanding of politics, economics, social
organization, and the like to arrive at their interpretation of the law.
It promotes our understanding of how the courts work to see that
those understandings are "political," in a useful sense that doesn't
impute crass motivations to the judges.475
Although the Court claimed that the issues presented in Sale were
strictly legal issues,476 the Court's opinion was in fact "political" in its
conspicuous silence on significant aspects of the Haitian refugee
crises.
Although the Commission's disposition of the Sale case involved a
much broader inquiry than that of the Sale Court, it too failed to ade-
quately address all sources of the Haitian Program, namely American
foreign policy designs. Furthermore, the Commission's consideration
of the legal questions presented in the Haitian refugee case was con-
strained by the racial contingencies of the very international instru-
ments that it was seeking to enforce. Eliminating future "Haitian
474. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 318.
475. MARK TUSHNET, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE LAW: THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL LIBER-
TIES, AND THE COURTS 8 (1988).
476. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165 (1993).
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Programs" will prove exceedingly difficult as long as the United States
continues to seek and maintain its position of disparity. At an initial
glance, it would seem easy to eliminate American manipulation of ref-
ugee law for foreign policy purposes by simply convincing the United
States government to remain true to the spirit, if not the letter, of
international and domestic law. Aside from being an unlikely solu-
tion, this approach-the path chosen by the Commission-fails to ac-
count for racial contingencies inherent in the formal legal
"protections" for refugees.
As James Hathaway has argued, the very definition of "refugee" in
international refugee law was intentionally drawn up to be somewhat
malleable. 477 By defining refugee in terms of social and political
rights, the drafters of the Convention singled out the difficulties of the
Soviet Bloc countries. 478 By excluding socioeconomic persecution and
the like, the drafters eliminated the realm of problems in the rest of
the Western world, thus virtually eliminating "western refugees" by
definition.479 The foundation of the formal international refugee pro-
tections, therefore, was laid in order to conform to Western political
objectives.
The original definition of a refugee in the Convention included only
those individuals whose flight was prompted by any pre-1951 event
within Europe. 480 This definition, promulgated under the auspices of
the United Nations, effectively doled out the burden of absorbing Eu-
ropean refugee movements to member-states without requiring recip-
rocation by European countries for non-European refugees.481 The
definition was not amended until the drafting of the Protocol more
than fifteen years later.482 Furthermore, the competency of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNCHR") office extended pro-
tection to include those displaced persons falling outside of the formal
protections.483 Thus, the UNCHR could coordinate regional resettle-
ment for displaced persons from Third World countries while denying
them relief under the (Eurocentric) formal instruments. 484 Assistance
to Third World "refugees," therefore, is merely voluntary, whereas in-
477. James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 136 (1990).
478. Id. at 149-50.
479. Id. at 150.
480. Id. at 152-53.
481. Id. at 156.
482. Protocol, supra note 50, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
483. Hathaway, supra note 477, at 158.
484. Id. at 159.
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ternational obligations, such as non-refoulement, are mandatory for
European refugees under the formal regime.
Finally, although the refugee definition was changed by the Proto-
col, most Third World refugees remain de facto excluded from formal
protections.48 5 "Persecution" as it is defined by the formal system re-
flects a European understanding of the term. Most Third World refu-
gee movements are prompted by broadly-based political and
economic turmoil rather than individualized "persecution" as it is un-
derstood in the European context. 48 6 By clearly denying protection
for those fleeing dismal economic situations, the drafters of the formal
protections effectively precluded individuals fleeing from Third World
countries. These persons, inevitably people of color, will always be
fleeing the economic conditions inherent in their political turmoil.
In the case of the Haitians, the formal regime for refugee protection
failed because it was built on a foundation of Eurocentric ideological
preferences. The refugee movement from Haiti was precisely the kind
of exodus that the drafters of the Convention feared. State parties to
the Protocol and/or Convention will continue to shirk their formal re-
sponsibilities unless the definition of refugee is broadened to account
for economic factors. Furthermore, the understanding of "persecu-
tion" must be more generalized.48 7 Finally, the Protocol and Conven-
tion must be enforced in a manner that does not allow a nation to
override its international obligations for domestic concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
When Sale was decided, it was easy for most commentators to criti-
cize judicial approval of the Haitian Program. To them, it was a set of
policies that needed to be changed in order to handle all refugees in
an equitable fashion. When placed against the background of past
Haitian-American relations, however, one understands that the ineq-
uities go far beyond refugee politics. Rather than an isolated instance
of injustice perpetrated by a government that typically acts within the
dictates of fairness and equality, the Haitian Program reflects another
chapter in Haiti's history of subordination and exploitation at the
hands of American foreign policy. The extent of American manipula-
tion of Haiti's internal politics, history demonstrates, is easily allowa-
485. Id. at 162.
486. Id.
487. The current definition of persecution requires an individualized and particularized fear of
persecution. It is the argument of this Comment that this definition should be expanded to
include other factors such as economic fears. See supra text accompanying note 55 for the cur-
rent definition of refugee.
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ble because of its population's blackness. 488 Indeed, it is not hard to
imagine the color of which Kennan's position of disparity is generally
composed: peoples not worthy of "vague" and "unreal" objectives
such as "human rights" and "world benefaction" because of the dark-
ness of their skin.489 Without this backdrop for discussing the Haitian
Program, its significance will be forever consigned to the ashcan of
history: forever buried deep within the American conscience.
James R. Zink
488. See supra text accompanying note 309.
489. See CHOMSKY, supra note 5, at 318.
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